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PERPETUATION OF SEGREGATION:
TOWARD A NEW HISTORICAL AND LEGAL
INTERPRETATION OF REDLINING UNDER
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
CHARLES L. NIER, III*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In his classic The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. Du Bois
commented: 'To be a poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a
land of dollars is the very bottom of hardships."1 His statement is
increasingly becoming a prophecy as the income and wealth gaps
between blacks and whites continue to increase despite the economic
prosperity in the United States.2 The inequitable distribution of
income has an effect on nearly all segments of American society as
evidenced by the fact that the "top 20 percent of earners receive 43
percent of all income while the poorest one-fifth of the population
receives a scant 4 percent of the total income."3 In terms of wealth
distribution, the statistics are even starker. By 1989, the wealthiest
1% of households accounted for 37.7% of the net worth and controlled
48.2% of all financial assets.4
* Assistant Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,
B.A. 1990, Ohio University, J.D. 1993, The
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University, L.L.M. 1994,
The Georgetown University Law Center.
1. W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 6 (1903).
2. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 30 (1995). Oliver and
Shapiro have distinguished wealth and income in the following manner:
Wealth is the total extent, at a given moment, of an individual's
accumulated assets and access to resources, and it refers to the net
value of assets ...less debt held at one time. Wealth is anything of
economic value bought, sold, stocked for future disposition, or invested
to bring an economic return. Income refers to a flow of dollars ... over a
set period, typically one year.
Id.
3. Id. at 29.
4. Id. at 62. "The top one percent of American households possessed over
25% of total wealth between 1922 and 1972." Id. at 61 (quoting Edward Wolff,
The Rich Get Increasingly Richer: Latest Data on Household Wealth During the
1980's, 5 RES. IN POL. AND SOC'Y 33-68 (1995)).
Beginning in 1972, however, the data indicates a significant decline in
wealth inequality. The share of the top percentile declined from 29% to 19%
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This social inequality is magnified when race is introduced into
the analysis. While progress toward racial equality is undoubtedly
being made, the median income figures establish that blacks earn
only about 55% that made by whites.5 The nearest income parity
between blacks and whites is seen in married families where both
husband and wife work. "In 1984, such black households earned
seventy-seven cents for every dollar taken home by their white
counterparts." 6 However, when the same group is evaluated in
terms of wealth, a glaring inequality is revealed: "dual-income black
households possessed only nineteen cents of mean financial assets
for every dollar their white counterparts owned."7 Thus, while
progress has been made in terms of income between blacks and
whites, the translation of this income into wealth has not been
accomplished. The sharp disparities in wealth inevitably lead to the
question why.
Oliver and Shapiro state that: "[h]ome ownership is without
question the single most important means of accumulating assets"
and thus increasing wealth.8 One of the explanations for the
enormous racial inequality in terms of wealth is directly attributable
to mortgage lending discrimination. In particular, the historical
practice of racial redlining has foreclosed the opportunity of
homeownership to vast numbers of African-Americans. A recent
study concluded that "[u]rban redlining has ruined and continues to
ruin thousands of minority communities." 9 The report noted that
despite the recent housing boom which has pushed national
homeownership to a record high of 65.7%, the private mortgage
industry continues to fail to meet the credit needs of urban buyers."
In 1995, only 49.0% of center city residents owned a home, compared
with 71.5% of their suburban counterparts."" Due to the high levels
of racial segregation in center city areas, such a disparity has
increasingly devastating results on the ability of minorities to
achieve home ownership. As a consequence, one of the primary
explanations for the large racial disparity in terms of wealth is
between 1972 and 1976. While this decline was unexpected, it was not
permanent. In fact in the next five-year period, from 1976 to 1981, a sharp
renewal of wealth inequality occurred. Between 1976 and 1981 the share of
the richest 1%expanded from 19 to 24%. Id. The wealth disparities continued
to increase throughout the 1980's primarily due to Reagan cuts in taxes on
capital gains on existing wealth. Id. at 63. "Indeed,... wealth concentration
in 1989 was more extreme than at any time since 1929." Id. at 62.
5. Id. at 24.
6. Id. at 25.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 8.
9. THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, AMERICA'S
HOMEOWNERSHIP GAP: How URBAN REDLINING AND MORTGAGE LENDING
DISCRIMINATION PENALIZE CITY RESIDENTS 1 (1998).

10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 3.
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mortgage lending discrimination in the form of racial redlining
which limits minority access to home ownership.
This article seeks to explore the historical and legal
ramifications of racial redlining and suggests a new analytical
framework to eradicate the practice. First, this article will examine
the historical origins of redlining in the United States, particularly,
the racially discriminatory policies of the Home Owners Loan
Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA). Second, this article will examine the applicable laws relating
to redlining, including: the Fair Housing Act, the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA), and the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA). Third, this article will explore the continued prevalence of
racial redlining in urban areas in the United States. Fourth, this
article will examine the analytical framework courts have adopted in
Fifth, this article will critique the
connection with redlining.
approaches adopted by the courts to demonstrate the inherent
problems in the existing methodology used to eradicate redlining.
Sixth, this article will explore a new analytical approach to
challenging polices and practices which result in racial redlining of
minority communities premised upon a theory of perpetuation of
segregation. Finally, this article will examine efforts by the United
States Department of Justice to eradicate racial redlining as an
example of a legal challenge premised upon the perpetuation of
segregation.

II.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF REDLINING IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Introduction
Prior to the 1930's, the United States had traditionally
considered the selection, construction, and purchase of a residence
As a result, the federal
an inherently individual decision.1"
government favored a "hands-off policy" regarding housing. 13 The
government's role was limited to surveying the slums of large cities
in 1892, creating a Federal Land Bank System in 1916, and
constructing housing for war workers during World War I.'"
With the Great Depression in 1929 came a shift in attitudes of
Americans regarding the government's intervention in housing
issues. 5 The economic devastation of the Great Depression inflicted16
crippling damage to both the homeowner and the housing industry.
During the five year span from 1928 to 1933, residential property

12. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF
THE UNITED STATES 191-92 (1985).
13. Id. at 193.
14. Id. at 192.
15. Id. at 193.
16. Id.
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construction decreased by 95%, while home repair expenditures
dropped 90%.17 By 1933 half of all the nation's residential mortgages
were technically in
18 default, with foreclosures reaching the rate of
over 1000 per day.
In response to the crisis, the federal government, in an attempt
to revive the economy, increase employment in the construction
industry, and make home ownership widely available to the
American public, introduced a series of programs, including: the
HOLC, the FHA, and the Veterans Administration. 19 While these
programs had enormous impact upon housing in the Unites States,
they also developed and implemented the practice of racial redlining.
As a result, it is necessary to examine each program to ascertain the
historical origins of racial redlining.
B. Home Owners' Loan Corporation
In 1933, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) was
established to "help families prevent the loss of their homes through
mortgage foreclosure."" In particular, the HOLC was designed to
provide "funds for refinancing urban mortgages in danger of default
and [to grant] low-interest loans to former owners who had lost their
homes through foreclosure to regain their properties." 21 "The HOLC
was the first government-sponsored program to introduce, on a mass
17. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 193.
18. Id. "In 1926, ... about 68,000 homes were foreclosed in the United States.

In 1930, about 150,000 non-farm households lost their property through
foreclosure; in 1931, [the number] increased to nearly 200,000; in 1932, to

250,000." Id.
19. DOUGLAS A. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51-52 (1993).

In 1931,

President Hoover convened the President's National Conference on Home
Building and Home Ownership designed "to support homeownership for men of
sound character and industrious habits." JACKSON, supra note 12, at 193. The

conference made four proposals: "1) the creation of long-term, amortized
mortgages; 2) the encouragement of low interest rates; 3) the institution of
government aid to private efforts to house low-income families; and 4) the

reduction of home construction costs." Id. at 194. In 1932, the Hoover
administration responded with two programs: the Federal Home Loan Bank Act
and the Emergency Relief and Construction Act. Id. Both programs, however,
proved ineffective and failed to reverse the worsening housing conditions. Id. at
194-95.
20. C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICES OF THE HOME OWNER'S LOAN
CORPORATION 1 (1951).

21. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 51. The HOLC program provided

for the exchange of HOLC bonds with federal guarantees for home mortgages in
default and cash loans for taxes payment and mortgage refinancing. HARRISS,
supra note 20, at 1. "The HOLC loans were restricted to mortgages in default...
and secured by nonfarm properties with... not more than four families and

appraised by the HOLC not more than $20,000." Id. An HOLC loan could not
exceed 80% of the HOLC appraisal and could not exceed $14,000. Id. Loans bore
less than 5% interest and were amortized by monthly payments during a 15 year
period. Id.
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scale, the use of long-term, self-amortizing mortgages with uniform
payments" which extended over a fifteen-year period.2 American
homeowners eagerly responded to the HOLC as approximately 40%
of all qualified mortgage properties sought assistance. 3 Between
July 1933 and June 1935, the HOLC supplied over three billion
dollars for over one million refinancing loans.'
Because the HOLC was dealing with mortgages in default with
the possibility of foreclosures, it introduced standardized appraisals
of the fitness of particular properties and communities for both
individual and group loans.2'5 As C. Lowell Harriss stated "the
success of the HOLC in its over-all program and
in its handling of
26
individual cases hinged on its appraisal policies."
While the appraisal itself was standard in the real estate
industry, the HOLC created a "formal and uniform system of
appraisal, reduced to writing, structured in defined procedures, and
implemented by individuals only after intensive training.""
HOLC appraisers divided cities into neighborhoods and
developed forms which required specific answers relating to the
inhabitants and housing stock.' As part of the appraisal process,

22. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 51. "An amortized loan requires
regular equal payments during the life of the loan, of sufficient size and number,
to pay all interest due on the loan and reduce the amount owed to zero by the
loan's maturity date." BRUCE HARWOOD, REAL ESTATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PROFESSION 179 (3d ed. 1983). Prior to the HOLC, "[1]ong term mortgage

arrangements were not common... because an 1864 amendment to the 1863
National Bank Act prohibited nationally chartered banks from making direct
loans for real estate transactions." JACKSON, supra note 12, at 362, n.25.
"[M]any loans required only the payment of interest, with the entire original
amount being due at the expiration of the loan." Id. at 362, n.16. As a result,
"the typical length of a mortgage was between five and ten years, and the loan
itself was not fully paid when the final settlement was due." Id. at 196. Thus,
the homeowner either had to pay off the loan or renew the mortgage. Such a
situation left the homeowner at the mercy of the economic situation because if the
mortgage expired at a time when money was tight, it might have been impossible
for the homeowner to secure a renewal, thus resulting in foreclosure. Id. at 19697.
23. HARRISS, supra note 20, at 1.
24. Id. "The HOLC received 1,886,491 applications for $6.2 billion dollars...
for an average of $3,272 per application." Id. Nearly half the applications were
rejected or withdrawn. Id. Approximately one million refinancing loans totaling
$3.1 billion were approved averaging $3,039 per loan. Id.
25. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 197. "[Iln some states, over 40% of all HOLC
loans were foreclosed... after refmancing." Id.
26. HARRISS, supra note 20, at 41.
27. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 197.
28. Id. First, the appraiser conducted "an informal appraisal, typically a look
at the property from the street" to determine if there was a reasonable prospect
that the property would qualify for a loan. HARRISS, supra note 20, at 45-48. "If
[the informal appraisal] was favorable, a detailed appraisal was ordered." Id.
The appraisal utilized a form containing 98 terms to be filled in by the appraiser
and 11 items to be completed by the reviewers. Id. Each report contained a

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:617

HOLW developed a rating system to evaluate the risks associated
with loans made to specific urban neighborhoods, systematically
including in the procedures an evaluation of the racial integration or
potential racial integration of the community.29
The rating system established four color-coded categories of
quality. The first category (A) was coded green and the areas were
described as "new, homogenous, and 'in demand as residential
locations in good times and bad times.'"3 Homogeneous was defined
as "American business and professional men."" The second category
(B) was coded blue and consisted of areas that had "reached their
peak," but were "still desirable" and could be expected to remain
stable."
The third category (C) was coded yellow with the
neighborhoods described as "definitely declining."3 3 The fourth
category (D) was coded red and the "neighborhoods were defined as
areas 'in which the things taking place in C areas have already
happened."''
In the process of rating neighborhoods, the HOLC incorporated
the notions of ethnic and racial worth.3 5 Appraisers assumed that

photograph of the building, a location map, dimensions of the lot and any other
relevant information concerning the neighborhood and property. Id. "In valuing
the buildings, the appraiser [considered] the building code classification .... the
material used,... the quality of the structure[,] ... the number and kinds of
rooms, [necessary repairs], and an estimate of reproduction cost less
depreciation." Id. at 76. The final element considered was the capitalized value
of rentals based upon a 10 year average normal rental. Id.
29. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 17; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note

19, at 51.
30. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 197.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 197-98
35. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 199. A widely reproduced list gives a ranking
of ethnic groups in order of most desirable to those which had the most adverse
effect on property values. HOMER HOYT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LAND VALUES
IN CHICAGO 316 (1933). The list was later reproduced in McMichael's Appraising
Manual, the "bible of appraising." Calvin Bradford, FinancingHome Ownership:
The FederalRole in Neighborhood Decline, 14 URB. AFF. Q. 313, 323 (1979). The

list ranks the ethnic groups as follows:
(1) English, Germans, Scotch, Irish, Scandinavians
(2) North Italians
(3) Bohemians or Czechs
(4) Poles
(5

Lithuanians

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Greeks
Russians, Jews (lower class)
South Italians
Negroes

(10) Mexicans.
Id. at 322. See also STANLEY L. MCMICHAEL, MCMICHAEL'S APPRAISING
MANUAL 160 (4th ed. 1951).
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the natural tendency of any area was to decline due to the age of the
physical structure and the filtration of the housing stock to families
with lower incomes.86 Richard M. Hurd explained that socioeconomic
characteristics of a neighborhood were much more important at that
time in determining the value of dwelling than structural
characteristics. In evaluating socioeconomic characteristics, HOLC
officials monitored the movement of black families with maps
charting the density of black settlement.'
Such philosophical
conceptions of property value combined with the anemic racism
existing in American society invariably resulted in black
neighborhoods being rated in category (D) and "redlined."9
Strong evidence exists to indicate that the HOLC impartially
issued mortgage assistance and made the majority of its obligations
in yellow and red neighborhoods.40 The funds distributed by HOLC
were relatively minor, and the major damage that the agency caused

36. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 198. This theory of urban and neighborhood
development originated at the University of Chicago, School of Human Ecology by
Robert Park and Homer Hoyt. Bradford, supra note 35, at 321. The model was
premised upon a comparison of urban development and plant biology. Id. The
model's premise was that just as certain pieces of land are best suited for a
particular type of plant, certain urban areas were best suited for particular types
of persons. Id. When an invading plant takes over an area inhabited by another
plant, it drives out the original plant because it is best suited for that
environment. Id. Such a theory applied to neighborhood development suggested
that different groups of people "infiltrated" and "invaded" territory that was held
by other groups and, through a Darwinistic survival of the fittest struggle,
eventually assumed control over the area completely. Id. In 1939, Homer Hoyt
elaborated on this theory in 'The Structure and Growth of Residential
Neighborhoods in American Cities." Id. at 322. Hoyt developed the "filtering" or
"trickle-down" model which suggested that as properties and neighborhoods got
older they fitered down to poorer and less capable persons until they were
transformed into slums. Id. Central to this model of neighborhood development
was the concept of race. As Frederick Babcock explained:
Most of the variations and differences between people are slight and
value declines are, as a result gradual. But there is one difference in
people, namely race, which can result in a very rapid decline. Usually
such declines can be partially avoided by segregation and this device has
always been in common usage in the South where white and negro
populations have been separated.
FREDERICK BABCOCK, THE VALUATION OF REAL ESTATE 91 (1932).

In this

manner, the infiltration of inharmonious racial groups became synonymous with
neighborhood decline. Bradford, supra note 35 at 322.
37. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 198.
38. Id. at 201.
39. Id. at 200. For example, Lincoln Terrace in St. Louis was originally
intended for middle class white families. Id. at 200. The project, however, was
unsuccessful and it developed into a black neighborhood. Id. Despite the fact the
homes were relatively new and of good quality, the HOLC gave the area a D
rating in 1937 and 1940. Id. It asserted that the houses had 'little or no value
today, having suffered a tremendous decline in values due to the colored element
now controlling the district." Id.
40. Id. at 202.
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was serving as a model for other credit institutions.4 The HOLC
system was adopted by private institutions in rendering loan
decisions, and the agency's "Residential Security Maps" were broadly
distributed throughout the lending industry. 42 As a consequence,
private banks adopted the HOLC's racially discriminatory polices
thereby institutionalizing and disseminating the practice of racial
redlining. The greatest effect of the HOLC rating system was its
influence on the underwriting practices of the FHA and the VA.43
C. FederalHousing Administrationand Veterans Administration
Kenneth Jackson proclaimed that: "[n]o agency of the United
States government has had a more pervasive and powerful impact
on the American people over the past half-century than the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA)."' The FHA, established in 1934,
and the VA, established in 1944, completely altered the residential
housing market in the United States by financing suburbanization. 4'
As a consequence, it is necessary to examine the FHA program and
its role in perpetuating and institutionalizing racial redlining.
The FHA program was designed to "encourage increased
mortgage lending, especially by those financial institutions which
In
were not already required to provide mortgage loans. '
particular, the program was designed "to encourage improvement in
housing standards and conditions, to facilitate sound home financing
on reasonable terms, and to exert a stabilizing influence on the
mortgage market."47 The FHA and the VA did not lend money or
build houses, rather they offered insurance to lenders to encourage
them to invest in residential mortgages while preventing losses on
the instruments. 8
Prior to the FHA program, first mortgages generally were
limited to one-half or two-thirds of the property's appraised value.4
As a result, a prospective purchaser needed a downpayment of 30%
of the value of property. The FHA program guaranteed over 90% of
the value of collateral for loans made by private banks which
decreased the size of the down payment to 10%."0 In addition, the
FHA program prolonged the repayment period to twenty-five or
thirty years, which resulted in low monthly payments, and insisted
41. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 52.
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 203.
45. Id. at 203-06.
46. Bradford, supra note 35, at 316; see also JACKSON, supra note 12, at 204
(noting that during the 1920's, savings and loan associations held one-half of the
United States' mortgage debt).
47. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 203.
48. Id. at 204
49. Id.
50. Id.
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on fully amortized loans.51 With the loans guaranteed by the FHA,
the risk to a bank was virtually eliminated which resulted in lower
interest rates for borrowers.52
The FHA's success was remarkable as housing starts and sales
exploded from 332,000 in 1936 to 619,000 in 1941. Also the national
rate of mortgage foreclosure was reduced from 250,000 non-farm
units in 1932 to 18,000 in 1951. 53 By the end of 1972, the FHA had
assisted eleven million families in buying houses and another
twenty-two million families in making home improvements.54 For the
first time in United States history home ownership became a reality
for many Americans. This remarkable success came at a price, as it
was largely confined to whites in the suburbs to the detriment of
African Americans residing in urban areas.
The administrative dictates in the FHA functioned in several
methods which favored the suburbs and neglected the center cities.
First, the FHA favored the financing of single-family detached homes
over multi-family projects by adopting polices which favored open
areas outside the congested center city.55 In particular, the FHA
established minimum standards for lot size, setbacks, and
separation from existing structures which in effect precluded many
center city residences from loan eligibility, including row houses and
attached dwellings." Second, the FHA favored new purchases over
repair of existing homes by providing only small home improvement
loans for short durations.57 As a consequence, it was often easier to
purchase a new home than to repair an existing one, which
prompted people to move out of the city rather than improve their
existing residences. 8
Third, the FHA required an "unbiased"
professional appraisal as a requirement to any loan guarantee. 9 The
purpose of the appraisal was to guarantee that throughout the term
of the mortgage the market value of the property would surpass the
outstanding debt. °
While the FHA used the HOLC's appraisal system as a model,
it further elaborated on the HOLC's system in its Underwriting
Manual.1 The appraisal was based on three elements: the property

51. Id.
52. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 53.
53. See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 204-05 (noting that there were 93,000

housing starts in 1933, and that after the FHA was established, housing starts
and sales dramatically increased each year: 1937 (332,000), 1938 (399,000), 1939
(458,000), 1940 (530,000), and 1941 (619,000)).

54. Id.
55. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 17.
56. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 208.

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 206.
Id.
Id. at 207.
Id.

61. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 18.
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itself, the mortgagor or borrower; and the neighborhood.62 The
purpose of the neighborhood evaluation was "to determine the degree
of mortgage risk introduced in a mortgage insurance transaction
because of the location of the property at a specific site."68 The
Underwriting Manual stated that "[i]f a neighborhood is to retain
stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied
by the same social and racial classes."' Further, appraisers were
warned of the dangers of infiltration of "inharmonious racial or
nationality groups." 5 As a means of enforcing this segregation, the
Underwriting Manual recommended "subdivision regulations and
suitable restrictive covenants" as an excellent method to maintain
neighborhood stability. 66 The FHA did not officially change this
policy until February 1950, two years after racial covenants were
declared unenforceable and contrary to public policy by the United
States Supreme Court.
Thus, "[tihe most basic sentiment
underlying the FHA's concern was its fear that property values
would decline if a rigid black and white segregation was not
maintained."68
Precise figures detailing the FHA's discrimination against
blacks are not available, however, county by county data showed a
distinct pattern of "redlining" in center-city counties while loan
activity thrived in suburban counties. 69 Given the importance of the
HOLC, FHA, and VA in residential housing markets, by the late
1950's many blacks were denied access to traditional sources of
housing finance by institutionalized procedures which resulted in
spiral of decline in many large cities. As a result, a dual home
62. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 207.
63. Id. The FHA utilized eight weighed factors to access the quality of a
residential areas: relative economic stability (40%); protection from adverse

influences (20%); freedom from special hazards (5%); adequacy of civic, social, and
commercial centers (5 %); adequacy of transportation (10%); sufficiency of utilities
and conveniences (5%); level of taxes and special assessments (5%); and appeal
(10%). Id.
64. Id. at 208.
65. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 54.
66. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 208. Such covenants were common legal

provision written into a deed to prohibit African Americans from occupying the

dwelling. Id. By the 1940's, it was estimated that 80% of the residential land in
Chicago was subject to restrictive covenants. UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 68(1947).
67. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 208 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1

(1948)).
68. OLIVER & SHAPIRO,

supra note

2,

at 18.

69. Id. Among a sample of 241 new homes in the St Louis metropolitan area

insured by FHA loans between 1935 and 1939, 220 were located in the suburbs.
12, at 209. See also Raymond A. Mohl, Making the Second
Ghetto in Metropolitan Miami, 1940-1960, in THE NEW AFRICAN AMERICAN

JACKSON,supra note

URBAN HISTORY (Kenneth W. Goings & Raymond A. Mohl ed. 1996); THOMAS J.
SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POST
WAR DETROIT (1996).
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financing market emerged where mortgage credit was accessible to
whites while African Americans were forced to rely on less favorable,
0
often predatory, forms of mortgage financing."
As Kenneth Jackson
summarized:
The lasting damage done by the national government was that it
put its seal of approval on ethnic and racial discrimination and
developed policies which had the result of the practical
abandonment of large sections of older, industrial cities. More
seriously, Washington actions were later picked up by private
citizens, so that banks and savings-and-loan institutions
institutionalized the practice of denying mortgages
"solely because
71
of the geographical location of the property."
As a consequence, it is necessary to examine the laws which
have been enacted to eradicate racial redlining, including the Fair
Housing Act, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and the
Community Reinvestment Act."2
70. Bradford, supra note 35, at 318 (citations omitted). Since traditional
sources of mortgage financing were effectively unavailable to African Americans,
the most common source of mortgage funds for African Americans was the
installment contract. Id. at 319 (citations omitted). "Under this arrangement, the
owner of property [sold] the property to a buyer who [paid] for it through monthly
installment payments to the original owner. There was no mortgage involved, but
the contract worked in a [similar] manner as a mortgage loan." Id. The buyer,
however, often did not gain title to the property until the last installment
payment was made. Id. Further, the installment contract was often written to
ensure that the buyer did not gain any equity in the property over the period of
the contract. Id. In addition, usury laws and mortgage interest rate ceilings did
not apply since the installment contract was a private contract between the
parties and a buyer could charge any interest rate that the buyer was willing to
pay. Id. Thus, African Americans were often charged high interest rates to
purchase homes at inflated prices. Id. Such a contractual arrangement could
obviously be utilized in a predatory manner because if the buyer missed a single
payment, the seller could take back the property without foreclosure proceedings
and the buyer would lose not only the property but all the payments previously
made on the contract. Id.
71. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 217.

72. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) may also be applicable to
redlining. It was enacted in 1975 in response to discrimination against women
who sought credit. The ECOA prohibits discrimination in any aspect of a credit
transaction on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital
status, age, and receipt of income from public assistance and good faith exercise
of rights under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)-(f)
(1992). See also Susan Blakeley, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and
Its Effects, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 655 (1981); Elwin Griffth, The Quest for Fair Credit
Reporting and Equal Credit Opportunity in Consumer Transactions,25 U. MEM.
L. REV. 37 (1994); Comment, Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976,

12 U. RICH. L. REV. 203 (1977). In addition, civil rights statutes 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 & 1982 may be applicable to redlining. Section 1981 states:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
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III. FAIR LENDING LAWS
A.

FairHousing Act

After the urban riots of the 1960's, discrimination in housing
became a major concern of the federal government. 3 In 1968, the
Kerner Commission, appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to
investigate the riots, issued a report which concluded: "[o]ur nation
is moving toward two societies, one black, one white - separate and
unequal."7' The Commission identified segregation as a major cause
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts"
includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and
conditions of the contractual relationship.
42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1982 states: "All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
73. The "new era in riots" began to surface in 1964 with a disturbance in
Harlem and to a lesser extent in Rochester, New York; Elizabeth and Jersey City,
New Jersey; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. MARY FRANCES BERRY, BLACK
RESISTANCE WHITE LAW: A HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN AMERICA

168 (rev. ed. 1994). The first major explosion of the 1960's occurred in Watts, Los
Angeles in August 1965. Id. at 169. During the six-day Watts riot, 34 persons
were killed, 1032 persons were injured, and 4000 persons were arrested. LERONE
BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA 422 (5th
ed. 1982). Two hundred businesses were completely destroyed and more than
700 were seriously damaged with total property damage estimated at thirty-five
million dollars. Id. In the summer of 1966, there were approximately 43
disorders in a number of cities, including Omaha, Chicago, Dayton, Cleveland,
Brooklyn, Jacksonville, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. Id. at 423-24. Eleven persons
were killed and over 400 persons were injured in the disturbances. Id. at 423. In
the spring and summer of 1967, there were approximately 150 disturbances,
.ranging from minor clashes to widespread arson, looting, and sniping," which
resulted in 83 deaths. BERRY, supra at 172; BENNET, supra at 424. Major
rebellions occurred in Newark with 23 persons killed and 1500 wounded and in
Detroit with 43 persons killed and 2000 wounded. BENNETT, supra at 424. The
seven day Detroit riot caused twenty million dollars in damage, with 7200
arrests, and resulted in the first use of federal troops in an American riot since
the Detroit riots of 1943. BERRY, supra at 172-73; BENNETT, supra at 424.
74. UNITED STATES NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968).

On July 29, 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order 11365
which established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
composed of Otto Kerner, John V. Lindsay, Fred R. Harris, Edward W. Brooke,
James C. Corman, William M. McCulloch, I. W. Abel, Charles B. Thornton, Roy
Wilkins, Katherine Graham Peden, and Herbert Jenkins. Id. at 534. The stated
purpose of the Commission was to investigate and make recommendations
regarding the origins of the recent major civil disorders; the development of
methods and techniques for averting or controlling such disorders; and the
appropriate role of the local, state, and Federal authorities in dealing with civil
disorders. Id.
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of the riots explaining: "[w]hat white Americans have never fully
understood - but what the Negro can never forget - is that white
society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created
it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it."75 As
a solution to the problems of the ghetto, the Commission called for a
federal fair housing law.76 The Commission also recommended that
federal housing programs be given a new thrust aimed at
overcoming the prevailing patterns of racial segregation.77 On April
75. Id. at 2. The Commission noted that while the early pattern of African
American settlement within metropolitan areas followed that of other immigrant
groups, the later phases of settlement diverged sharply from those of the typical
white immigrant group. Id. at 243-44. In particular, white immigrants were
absorbed and dispersed by the larger society resulting in middle class
neighborhoods in the cities and suburbs with no distinctive ethnic character,
except that they were white. Id. at 244. This pattern of dispersal did not occur in
African American neighborhoods because they have been effectively precluded
from white residential areas by various discriminatory practices. Id. The
Commission explained that segregation was exacerbated by "white flight" which
it defined as "withdrawal from, or refusal to enter neighborhoods where large
numbers of Negroes are moving or already residing." Id. The Commission
concluded that "[t]he rapid expansion of all-Negro residential areas in central
cities and large-scale white withdrawal from them have continued a pattern of
residential segregation that has existed in American cities for decades." Id. at
246.
76. Id. at 475. The Kerner Commission concluded that in the "Negro ghetto,
grossly inadequate housing continues to be a critical problem." Id. at 468. In
addition to the enactment of a federal fair housing law, the Commission
recommended a number of other proposals, including:
Provision of 600,000 low and moderate-income housing units [within a]
year and 6 million units over the next five years.
An expanded and modified below-market interest rate program.
An expanded and modified rent supplement program, and an ownership
supplement program.
Federal write-down of interest rates on loans to private builders.
An expanded and more diversified public housing program; an expanded
Model Cities Program.
A reoriented and expanded urban renewal program.
Reform of obsolete building codes.
Reorientation of federal housing programs to place more low and
moderate-income housing outside of ghetto areas.
Id. at 475; see also 475-82.
77. Id. at 474-80. In fact, the FHA had begun shifting its policies in 1966 in an
effort to make more mortgage insurance available to inner city properties.
JACKSON, supra note 12, at 214-15. The FHA's policy change resulted in a
relaxation of underwriting standards and practices to such an extent as to
exclude lending in "[o]nly those instances where a property has so deteriorated or
is subject to such hazards .... that the physical improvements are endangered or
the livability of the property or the health or safety of its occupants are seriously
affected." Bradford, supra note 35, at 326 (citing Letter from the Commissioner of
FHA to all approved FHA mortgagees, August 2, 1968). Ironically, these
circumstances created a system whereby realtors and mortgage bankers could
make high profits by increasing the speed of racial transformation in
neighborhoods in several manners. First, it created an increased pool of credit
which allowed whites to finance an escape from neighborhoods experiencing
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4, 1968, the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the
ensuing riots provided the final impetus for the establishment of a
federal fair housing act. 8
The Fair Housing Act had two major goals: to expand minority
housing opportunities and to foster residential integration.9 It was
designed to facilitate the replacement of the ghettoes "by truly
integrated and balanced living patterns." ° Further, Senator Walter
Mondale, a principal sponsor of the Act, acknowledged the role of
past governmental discrimination in establishing and perpetuating
the ghetto. He stated: "Negroes who live in slum ghettos, however,
have been unable to move to suburban communities and other
exclusively white areas .... An important factor contributing to
exclusion of Negroes from such areas, moreover, has been the
policies and practices of agencies of government at all levels. '8'
The declared policy of the Fair Housing Act states: "[i]t is the
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 2 To
achieve this policy, the Fair Housing Act including Sections 3604
and 3605, which are applicable to mortgage lending discrimination

racial transformation. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 215; Bradford, supra note 35,
at 327. Second, "the relaxed credit standards for black applicants meant that
home improvement companies could buy properties at low cost, make cosmetic
improvements, and sell the renovated home at a inflated prices approved by [the]
FHA." JACKSON, supra note 12, at 215. In addition, the FHA had essentially no
enforcement mechanism to supervise the soundness of the FHA-insured loans
that were being made by its lenders. Bradford, supra note 35, at 328. Such a
confluence of circumstances in the FHA program invited fraud and abuse which
culminated in massive numbers of foreclosed and abandoned properties as many
blacks could not afford the cost of maintenance on their sub-standard properties
purchased at inflated prices. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 215; Bradford, supra
note 35, at 328. The result was "a national scandal and the subject of numerous
congressional hearings, investigations, and reforms" which further contributed to
the problems of the inner city housing market. Bradford, supra note 35, at 328.
78. Following a two month manhunt, James Earl Ray was captured by
Scotland Yard in London and charged with the murder of Dr. King. Lawrence
Van Gelder, James Earl Ray, 70, Killer of Dr. King, Dies in Nashville, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1998, at A25. Subsequently, Ray pleaded guilty to the charges of
murdering Dr. King and was sentenced to 99 years imprisonment with no
eligibility for parole. Id. The plea, which waived right to a trial, allowed him to
avoid the death penalty. Id. Later, Ray recanted his confession and maintained
his innocence up until his death in 1998. Id. See also GERALD POSNER, KILLING
THE DREAM: JAMES EARL RAY AND THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. (1998). The assassination ignited a series of disturbances in 36 states and
138 cities. BERRY, supra note 73, at 179. In Washington, D.C., there were 11
deaths and 1113 injuries, in Chicago there were nine deaths and 500 injuries, and
in Baltimore there were six deaths and 900 injuries. Id.
79. ROBERT SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION 1040 (1990).
80. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968).
81. 114 CONG. REC. 2277 (1968).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
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and racial redlining, declared unlawful a wide range of
discriminatory practices in -the housing and real estate industries.
Section 3604 of the Act relates to discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing and makes it an unlawful practice to refuse to sell,
rent or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling because of
race.8
Section 3605 of the Act addresses discrimination in
residential real estate-related transactions. Section 3605 states that
it shall be an unlawful practice to discriminate "against any person
in making available" or "in the terms or conditions of such a
[residential real estate-related] transaction."'
Residential real
estate-related transaction" is defined as "[t]he making or purchasing
of loans or providing other financial assistance for purchasing,
83. Id. § 3604(a). Section 3604 states that it shall be unlawful:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the
sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference,
limitation, or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not
available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so
available.
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent
any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective
entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.
Id.
84. Id. § 3605(a). Section 3605 was amended in 1988, and prior to
amendment, the section stated:
After December 31, 1968, it shall be unlawful for any bank, building and
loan association, insurance company or other corporation, association,
firm or enterprise whose business consists in whole or in part in the
making of commercial real estate loans, to deny a loan or other financial
assistance to a person applying therefor for the purpose of purchasing,
constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling, or to
discriminate against him in the fixing of the amount, interest rate,
duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial
assistance, because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such person or of any person associated with him in connection with
such loan or other financial assistance ... or of the present or
prospective owners, lessees, tenants, or occupants of the dwelling or
dwellings in relation to which such loan or other financial assistance is
to be made or given ....
Id. Historical and Statutory Notes.
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constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling" and
"[t]he selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property." 5
As a consequence, the Fair Housing Act contains several provisions
which may be utilized to eradicate racial redlining.
B. Home Mortgage DisclosureAct
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) was enacted in
1975 as a Congressional response to the finding "that some
depository institutions have sometimes contributed to the decline of
certain geographic areas by their failure pursuant to their chartering
responsibilities to provide adequate home financing to qualified
applicants on reasonable terms and conditions."'
HMDA is an
informational disclosure law designed to assist citizens and public
officials in determining whether "depository institutions are filling
their obligations to serve the housing needs of the communities and
neighborhoods in which they are located.8' 7
As originally enacted, HMDA required financial institutions to
provide information on the census tracts and income levels of
successful mortgage applicants.' In 1990, however, the HMDA was
amended requiring financial institutions to file annual reports
regarding their mortgage loan applications, including: their rejection
and acceptance rates by race, census tract location of properties, and
several other statutorily required factors.89 As a consequence,
beginning in 1991, a series of controversial studies have been
published analyzing the HMDA data, concluding that significant
differences exist with regards to the rejection rates of black and
white mortgage loan applicants." While the Federal Reserve Board
85. Id. § 3605(b).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 2801(a) (1994).
87. Id. § 2801(b).
88. Id. § 2803(a)(1)-(2).
89. Financial institutions covered by HMDA must collect and report two
general types of data: data about the application and data concerning the
applicant. Deanna Caldwell, An Overview of FairLending Legislation, 28 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 333, 334 (1995).

The information which relates to the

application, includes: "date application received; type of loan... ;purpose... ;
amount of loan requested or granted; owner occupancy status of property;
location.., of the property affected by the application; disposition of the
applica[nt]... ; and the date action was taken on the application." Id. The
information which relates to the applicant, includes race, sex, and gross annual
income. Id. The possible racial classifications include American Indian, Asian or
Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic, White, other, not provided, or not applicable.
Id. For denied applications, covered reporters have the option of reporting up to
three reasons why the application was not approved, including "debt-to-income

ratio, employment history, credit history, collateral, insufficient cash, unverifiable
information, application incomplete, mortgage insurance denied, and other." Id.
90. A Federal Reserve study analyzing the 1990 Home Mortgage Disclosure

Act data from 9300 financial institutions revealed loan rejection rates of 12.9% for
Asians, 14.4% for Anglos, 21.4% for Latinos, 22.4% for American Indians, and
33.9% for blacks.

Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Home Mortgage

1999]

Redlining Under the FairHousing Act

has indicated that the data is limited and cannot be used as
conclusive evidence of discriminatory lending practices, the
information acts as a "red flag," warranting additional investigation
to determine if unlawful mortgage lending discrimination exists."1
C. Community Reinvestment Act
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted in 1977
as a Congressional response to redlining. Senator Proxmire, a
sponsor of the Act, explained:
[F]or more than 2 years the Banking Committee has been studying
the problem of redlining and the disinvestment by banks and
savings institutions in older urban communities. By redlining let
me make it clear what I am talking about. I am talking about the
fact that banks and savings and loans will take their deposits from a
community and instead of reinvesting them in that community, they
will... actually or figuratively draw a red line on a map around the
areas of their city,...

sometimes in the older neighborhoods,

sometimes ethnic and sometimes92 black, but often encompassing a
great area of their neighborhood.
The CRA's stated purpose was to encourage financial
institutions "to help meet the credit needs of the local communities
in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such institutions."93 It required federal regulatory
agencies, in connection with an examination of a financial
Disclosure Act: Expanded Data on Residential Lending, 77 FED. RESERVE BULL.

859, 870 (1991). The Federal Reserve study found even more striking evidence of
mortgage lending discrimination in its analysis of home mortgages at the highest
income levels. At the highest income levels, the HMDA statistics revealed denial
rates of 8.5% for Anglos, 11.2% for Asians, 12.8% for American Indians, 15.8% for
Latinos, and 21.4% for blacks. Id. at 872. The statistics established that blacks
at the highest income levels were being denied mortgage loans at higher rates
then whites at the lowest income levels. Id. Further studies confirmed that
racial disparities in home mortgage lending continued from 1991 through 1994.
According to the 1992 HMDA statistics, the denial rates were 35.9% for black
applicants, 27.3% for Hispanics, and 15.9% for white applicants. 1992 HMDA
Data Show Racial Disparitiesin Loan Denial Rates, 9 FAIR HoUs.-FAIR LENDING

§ 7.5 (1994). According to the 1991 HMDA statistics the denial rates were 37.4%
for African American applicants, 26.5% for Hispanics and 17.3% for white
applicants. Id. Although the 1994 HMDA statistics indicated a sharp increase in
the number of mortgage loans granted to blacks, such applicants still had denial
rates of 31.2% versus 16.7% for white applicants. Minority Home Loans Up
Sharply In '94, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, Feb. 16, 1996, at 71. A Wall Street
Journal computer analysis indicated that home loan approvals for blacks rose
more than 38% in 1994 from 1993, while approvals for whites rose just under
12%. Id. In 1997, the denial rate for African American mortgage applicants rose
to 53% an increase of more than 3% from 1996. 1997 HMDA Data Released;
Minority DenialRates Rise, 9 FAIR HOUS.-FAIR LENDING § 10.4 (1998).

91. Canner & Smith, supra note 90, at 859.
92. 123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977).

93. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1998).
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institution, to assess the "institution's record of meeting the credit
needs of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods" and to "take such record into account in its
evaluation 9 4of an application for a deposit facility by such
institution."

In 1989, the CRA was amended to mandate the public
disclosure of a written assessment and rating of the CRA
performance of financial institutions. 9
Further, the financial
regulatory agencies may use the ratings to block a financial
institution's efforts to acquire or merge with other financial
institutions or to build or open new branches. Even with the
freedom to evaluate financial institutions according to their CRA
performance, the CRA was rarely used as a basis to deny mergers
and acquisitions."6 As a consequence, the CRA is primarily an

94. Id. § 2903(a). The term "appropriate federal financial supervisory agency"
means:
the Comptroller of the Currency with respect to national banks;
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System with respect to
state chartered banks which are members of the Federal Reserve
System... ;
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation with respect to state
chartered banks and savings banks which are not members of the
Federal Reserve System... ; and...
(4) the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, in the case of a
savings association [ ] and a savings and loan holding company[.]
Id. § 2902(1).
95. Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination:
Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act,
85 GEO. L.J. 237, 243 (1996). The written evaluations consist of a public and
confidential section. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)(2) (1994). The public section consists of
the appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency's conclusions for each
assessment factor, the facts and data supporting such conclusions, the
institution's rating, and a statement describing the basis for the rating. Id.
§ 2906(b)(1). The institution may be rated as follows: "Outstanding,"
"Satisfactory," "Needs to improve," and "Substantial noncompliance." Id. §
2906(b)(2). "The confidential section of the written evaluation... contain[s] all
references that identify any customer of the institution, any employee or officer of
the institution, or any person or organization that has provided information in
confidence to [the] supervisory agency." Id. § 2906(c)(1).
96. Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 95, at 243 n.33. CRA examinations have
been nearly impossible to fail. Id. "Of the 26,000 CRA examinations conducted
from 1985 to 1989, only 2.4% resulted in poor grades." Id. (citing Allen J.
Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It Works, but
Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 296
(1993)). In 1992, 10% received an outstanding rating and 80% received a
satisfactory rating. Id. at 243 n.37 (citing A "Better Than Satisfactory" Grade?:
Fed'sAdvisors, Lindsey Concur on 5th CRA Rating, AM. BANKER, June 15, 1992,
at 10). Further, in 1993, Carolyn Brown stated that since 1977, 70,000
applications for expansions, mergers, and acquisitions have been reviewed under
the CRA, only 20 of which have been rejected for poor CRA compliance. Carolyn
M. Brown, How to Fight Mortgage Discrimination... And Win!!, BLACK
ENTERPRISE, July, 1993, at 48.
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information tool to document the lending practices of financial
institutions. 9'
In conclusion, it is clear that Congress recognized the existence
of redlining and identified it as major cause of ghettoes and
In its efforts to address the ills associated with
segregation.
redlining, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act, and the Community Reinvestment Act.
Despite the existence of such laws, it appears that the issue of
redlining continues to persist depriving minorities of home mortgage
loans. While financial institutions no longer draw red lines around
minority areas in the classic sense of the word, the practice has
evolved to the point where it is characterized by marketing practices
and policies that effectively preclude minority areas. Consequently,
it is necessary to examine a study demonstrating both the evolution
of redlining and confirming its continued existence throughout the
United States.
IV. MARKET REDLINING

Numerous studies have examined and confirmed the continued
existence of redlining in the provision of home mortgage loans. 98
97. See generally Molle Bennett, Comment, Resolving the Community
Reinvestment Act Dilemma: Eliminating "Whites Only" Mortgage Lending While
Reducing Regulatory Red Tape, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1145 (1993); Richard
Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 165 (1993); Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act:
Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281
(1993); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993); Peter P. Swire, Safe
Harborsand a Proposalto Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L.
REV. 349 (1993); Andrew Miller, Comment, The New York Proposal to Revise the
Community Reinvestment Act: A Quantitative Step Towards Objectivity and
Effectiveness, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 951 (1994); Leonard Bierman et al., The
Community Reinvestment Act: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 383 (1994); Gary M. Swidler, Note, Making the Community Reinvestment Act
Work, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 387 (1994); A. Brooke Overby, The Community
Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431 (1995); E. L. Baldinucci,
Note, The Community Reinvestment Act: New Standards Provide New Hope, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831 (1996); Laura Turner Beyer, Note and Comment, The
Community Reinvestment Act: A Boost to Low - and Moderate Income
Communities, A Set-Back For Minority-Owned Banks, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 387
(1997); Joseph Moor, Note and Comment, The Community Reinvestment Act and
Its Impact on Bank Mergers, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 412 (1997); Lara L. Spencer,
Note and Comment, Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act: The Courthouse
Doors Are Closed, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 169 (1998).
98. Harriett Taggert and Kevin Smith identified three generations of studies
regarding redlining. Harriett Tee Taggart & Kevin W. Smith, Redlining: An
Assessment of the Evidence of Disinvestment in Metropolitan Boston, 17 URB.
AFFAIRS Q. 91, 92 (1981). The first group of studies were based on information
obtained through property transfer records, census data, annual financial reports
of individual banks, and case histories of mortgage application experiences of
local residents. Id.
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A recent study examined the issue of racial redlining by major
mortgage lenders in the nation's sixteen largest metropolitan areas. 99
The study identified the continued prevalence of redlining by
identifying sixty-two "worst case lending patterns" whereby lenders
excluded minority neighborhoods."'

Among the more extensive studies of this series were analyses done on
Baltimore (Home Ownership Development Program, 1973), Chicago
(Bradford et al., 1975; Feins, 1976), Cincinnati (McKee, 1974), Los
Angeles (Center for New Corporate Priorities, 1975), New York (Devine
et al., 1973), Philadelphia (Northwest Community Housing Association,
1973) and Washington, D.C. (Public Interest Research Group, 1975).
Id. A second group of studies were based upon geographic breakdowns of
mortgage loan activity collected pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act. Id. at 92-93.
These studies included a survey of eight metropolitan areas
(Pryzbyliski, 1978), an analysis of several cities in California (California
Department of Savings and Loans, 1978), a study of each of the
metropolitan areas in Connecticut (Gold, 1977), an analysis of mortgage
and deposit disclosure data for metropolitan Boston (Taggart et al.,
1977), and a preliminary report on each of the metropolitan areas in
New York (New York State Banking Department, 1977).
Id. A third group of studies were based upon individual mortgage applicant and
borrower data. Id. at 93. Such data was developed through several methods,
including: "surveys developed by research personnel posing as applicants;
interviews conducted with homebuyers, examination of written applications for
mortgage loans; and risk studies designed to analyze lenders mortgage loan
activity in urban areas and suburban areas." Id. (citations omitted).
99. JONATHAN

BROWN,

RACIAL

REDLINING:

A

STUDY

OF

RACIAL

DISCRIMINATION BY BANKS AND MORTGAGE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES 4
(1993), reprinted at (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http'//www.essential.org/pnbcc/red
hne/redl.html>. The 16 metropolitan areas were: New York, Boston, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Washington D.C., Philadelphia, Detroit, Houston, Miami, Baltimore,
Oakland, Atlanta, Dallas, St. Louis, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh. Id. at Table 1.
"According to the 1990 Census data, the 16 metropolitan areas contained 38.3
percent of the total African American population and 40.4 percent of the total
Hispanic population." Id. at 14.
100. Id. at 5. The study was based upon a computer-assisted analysis of
1,256,982 home purchase loan applications in sixteen metropolitan areas during
1990 and 1991 maintained by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act. Id. at 4-5. The data was analyzed "to identify and
select any lenders that were major home purchase loan originators within a
metro[politan] area but made comparatively few loans within the metro[politan]
area's minority neighborhoods. Then [the study] mapped the home mortgage
lending patterns of [those] selected lenders at the metro[politan] area level." Id.
at 5. Based upon this analysis, the study developed four criteria which had to be
met in order for a lender to be designated as "worst case. lending pattern." Id.
The criteria were as follows:
1. The lender had to rank among the top 20 home purchase loan
originators within the metro area;
2. The lender had to rank among the lowest of the major home
purchase loan originators within a given metro area, in terms of the
percentage of a lender's total home purchase loan originations in the
metro area made in minority neighborhoods, as determined by HMDA
statistics;
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The study reached several significant conclusions regarding the
practice of redlining. First, it explained that "a lack of loan
applications from minority neighborhoods, rather than a low loan
application approval rate [was] the immediate cause" of most of the
worst lending patterns. 0' As a consequence, the issue of redlining
was not an issue of disparate treatment of individual applicants but
rather the result of a failure to effectively market and solicit
applications from minority communities."' Such a conclusion is
consistent with the continuing legacy of the HOLC and FHA, later
adopted by the private lenders which resulted in the complete failure
to provide mortgage lending service to minority communities.
Second, the study examined the evolution of redlining by
demonstrating that its continued existence was related to the
marketing practices espoused by lenders in delineating "effective
lending territory." In particular, the study explained:
[t]he effective lending territories of major lenders do not arise
spontaneously. Rather, they are actively shaped by the marketing
strategies of lending institutions. Most major lenders do not wait
passively for customers to walk into their offices and request loan
application forms. Instead, they actively initiate specific marketing
strategies that target certain types of customers, often upscale
persons, and particular geographic areas. The lending patterns that
emerge are thus the end result of a series of choices by mortgage
lenders, such as where to locate retail offices; who to hire as agents
to solicit mortgage loan applications; which real estate brokers and
mortgage brokers to cultivate
for business relationships; and what
03
advertising tactics to adopt.
The study demonstrated that the continuing prevalence of
redlining was directly related to the effects of the policies and
practices adopted by lenders rather than "the underlying preferences

3. The lender had to originate home purchase loans throughout most of
the metro area or at least large segments of it; and
The lender had to exhibit a pattern of excluding or substantially
underserving minority areas.

Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 8.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 23. The study noted several lending polices and practices which may
have a disparate impact on minorities, including:

Minimum loan amounts...;
High down-payment requirements;
Very low ceilings on monthly-payment-to-income ratios;
Refusal to engage in FHA insured lending or to develop flexible
conventional financing alternatives;

Refusal to lend on 2-4 family structures in metro areas ... ; and
Use of appraisal standards that tend to undervalue 1-4 family
structures in minority neighborhoods.
Id. at 27.
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and choices of mortgage loan applicants.""°
A third issue addressed by the study related to a frequent
explanation offered by lenders relating to the limited demand in
minority areas. The study concluded that the "flow of home
purchase loans in minority neighborhoods broadly defined was on
the average... 54% of the flow in moderate income white
neighborhoods and 44% of the flow in white neighborhoods in
general." °5 The study concluded that while the flow of home
purchase loans was markedly less than the flow in white
neighborhoods,
an active market did exist throughout many minority
06
areas.
Thus, the study establishes that redlining continues to exist
and that a major cause of redlining is the effect of marketing
practices and polices of lenders which operate to exclude minority
neighborhoods. It appears such practices are a direct "vestige of
discrimination" from the blatantly racially discriminatory practices
of the HOLC and FHA which were adopted by private lenders. As a
consequence, it is necessary to examine several relevant court
decisions in order to access the legal, analytical framework designed
to address the racially discriminatory practice of racial redlining.

V. THE LEGAL FORMULATION OF REDLINING
In the thirty years since the passage of the Fair Housing Act,
there have been relatively few court decisions regarding the practice
of redlining. It was not until 1976 that a court addressed the
justiciability of a cause of action premised upon redlining. In
Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., Robert and Kathleen
Laufman alleged that their mortgage loan application was denied
due to redl*ining practices in violation of Sections 3604 and 3605 of
the Fair Housing Act of 1968.107 The Oakley Building and Loan
104. Id. at 8.
105. BROWN, supra note 99, at 25.

106. Id. The study examined the HMDA data base in the 16 metropolitan
areas to determine if "there were major mortgage lenders that actively served the
minority community." Id. The study concluded that "[i]n many of these metro
areas,

there were,

indeed,

major lenders

affirmatively serving minority

communities." Id. In particular, the study cited "large depository institutions
operating in their home markets or the closely related mortgage affiliates of such
institutions." Id.
107. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 491 (S.D. Ohio
1976). The plaintiff also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3617 which provides
that "it shall be unlawful to... interfere with any person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of
his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of,
any right granted or protected by sections 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title"
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), which provides
that no person shall be denied on the basis of race, color, or national origin "the
benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. at 491, 498.
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Company sought summary judgment.' 8
The court rejected the defendant's contention that Section 3604
of the Fair Housing Act was strictly limited to discrimination in the
sale or rental of housing.'0 9 The court held that Section 3604's
explicit application to other situations indicates that it "deals with
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing in the broadest
possible manner,.., so that its coverage clearly extends beyond the
usual purview of the terms 'sale or rental.""'0 Further, the court held
that Section 3605's prohibition of discrimination in financing
housing was an explicit prohibition of "redlining.""' The court
reasoned: "the practice of 'redlining' would seem to fall under the
proscription against denial of loans and financial assistance on the
basis of race... where the purpose of the loan was to finance the
purchase of a home in an integrated neighborhood.""'
In reaching its decision, the court examined the legislative
history of the Fair Housing Act." 3 The court noted that a primary
concern of the legislation was to address "the rioting and civil
disturbances that had rocked the central cores of many of the
nation's major cites the previous summer.""4 Relying upon the final
report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
published in March 1968, the court noted a major cause of the racial
disorders of the summer of 1967 was residential segregation and
racial slum formation."' The court stated:
Little imagination is required to understand that the imposition of
barriers to occupancy in the form of higher mortgage-interest rates
or refusals to make loans in connection with housing in changing
neighborhoods works to discourage families, white or black, which
could afford to purchase homes in such neighborhoods.
The
practical effect is to discourage whites-who may freely move
elsewhere-from
moving
into
vacancies
in
"changing"
neighborhoods, thereby inducing "massive transition" and,
ultimately, "white flight." Thus, according to this view, redlining
directly contributes to the decay of our cities. ' 6
108. Id. at 491.

109. Id. at 492.
110. Id. The court noted that Section 3604(b), which prohibits racial
discrimination "in the provision of services or facilities," has been interpreted to
include "municipal services such as sewage treatment." Id. The court also noted
that Section 3604(c), which "prohibits racially discriminatory advertising
practices in connection with the sale or rental of housing[,] ... has been
interpreted as prohibiting the recorder of deeds in the District of Columbia from
accepting for filing instruments that contain racially restrictive covenants." Id. at

492-493 (citing Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
111. Laufman, 408 F. Supp. at 493.

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 496-98.
Id. at 496.
Id.

116. Laufiman, 408 F. Supp. at 496-97.
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The court explained that Congress responded to the riots of
1967 with the "passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, including- as
recommended by the [National Advisory] Commission-the strong
Fair Housing legislation [which was] before the Court." 7 The court
determined that the provisions of the Fair Housing Act should be
given "a generous construction" in order to effectuate the purposes of
Congress."18
The court concluded that both Sections 3604 and 3605
The court held that
proscribed the practice of redlining."'
"[t]ransactions involving both the sale or rental of a dwelling and
real estate loans or other financial assistance in connection with the
sale or rental of the dwelling are subject to both provisions.""0 While
the court's decision firmly established the justiciability of a cause of
action premised- upon redlining, courts found the necessity to
address the analytical 121framework for establishing a cause of action
premised on redlining.

117. Id. at 497.
118. Id. (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 204, 212 (1972)).
119. Laufman, 408 F. Supp. at 498. The court also noted that the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Federal Home Loan Bank

Board (FHLBB), "which share responsibility for administering the Fair Housing
Act, have unanimously interpreted its provisions as applicable to racial
redlining." Id. at 494. The court cited a HUD report on an extensive survey of
lending institutions which stated that "redlining of areas in a community in
which minority group families are concentrated and the refusal to make loans in
these areas.., are prohibited by Title VIII.' Id. (quoting HUD (Office of Equal
Opportunity), Private Lending Institutions Questionnaire, Initial Report on
Returns (Apr. 25, 1972)). The court cited FHLBB regulations which stated:
Refusal to lend in a particular area solely because of the age of the
homes or the income level in a neighborhood may be discriminatory in
effect since minority group persons are more likely to purchase used
The racial
housing and to live in low-income neighborhoods.
composition of the neighborhood where the loan is to be made is always
an improper underwriting consideration.
Id. at 495 (quoting 12 C.F.R. 531.8(c)(6)).
120. Id. at 493.
121. The practice of redlining is not limited only to mortgage lending, it is also
applicable in the context of property insurance. In Dunn v. Midwestern Indem.
Mid-Am. Fire and Casualty Co., 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979), an action
was brought against an insurer under the Fair Housing Act alleging "insurance
redlining." Id. at 1107. On motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted, the court held that "insurance redlining," "a
discriminatory failure or refusal to provide property insurance on dwellings,"
violates provisions of the FHA. Id. at 1112. In addition, the court held that the
allegation that the insurer had determined to cancel a certain business portfolio
"based on fact that the portfolio included 'a significant portion of black
homeowners and/or persons residing in predominantly black neighborhoods'"
stated a claim on which relief could be granted under FHA. Id. at 1107, 1112.
However, in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 724 F.2d 419, 425 (4th Cir.
1984), the Fourth Circuit held that insurance redlining is not prohibited by
Section 804(a) or any other provision of the Act.
In an effort to resolve the conflicting opinions, the United States
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In Old West End Association v. Buckeye Federal Savings &
Loan, a white couple attempted to purchase a home in Old West End
of Toledo, a neighborhood where blacks exceeded 40% of the
population. 122 After Buckeye Federal Savings and Loan Association
rejected the plaintiffs initial loan application, they filed an action
under the Fair Housing Act and several other civil rights statutes
alleging that the defendant had engaged in the discriminatory
practice of redlining.121 Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment.'

In developing an analytical framework to examine redlining,
the court modified the analysis enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.1n The court
Department of Housing and Urban Development issued regulations which
explicitly declared insurance redlining as prohibited conduct. 24 C.F.R. §
100.70(d)(4). In NAACP v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287 (7th
Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that insurance
redlining is covered and prohibited by Section 804(a) of the Fair Housing Act
and its "otherwise make unavailable" language. Id. at 301. Central to the
court's decision was the HUD determination that Section 804(a) covered
insurance redlining. Id. at 300. The Court explained: "Lenders require their
borrower to secure property insurance. No insurance, no loan; no loan, no
house; lack of insurance makes housing unavailable." Id. at 297. As a result,
it appears that insurance redlining is prohibited by the provisions of the Fair
Housing Act.
122. Courts have previously held that non-minorities have standing to
maintain a discrimination action for injuries caused by racially discriminatory
policies. For example, the United States Supreme Court held that a white person
had standing under the Fair Housing Act due to the loss of important benefits
from interracial associations. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 212 (1972). The Court, after reviewing the legislative history of the Act,
found that "[w]hile members of minority groups were damaged the most from
discrimination in housing practices, the proponents of the legislation emphasized
that those who were not the direct objects of discrimination had an interest in
ensuring fair housing, as they too suffered." Id. at 210. In Harrisonv. Heinzeroth
Mortgage Co., a complaint was filed by "white persons who attempted to purchase
a home in an integrated or predominantly black neighborhood, [and] were refused
a mortgage loan with terms and conditions equal to those of loans on homes in
predominantly white neighborhoods." 414 F. Supp. 66, 67 (N.D. Ohio 1976). The
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that "[iut is enough that a
complainant demonstrate that he was denied housing opportunities solely on the
basis of racial considerations." Id. at 67.
123. Old West End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan, 675 F. Supp. 1100, 1102
(N.D. Ohio 1987). The plaintiff also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981,
1982, 1985(3). Id. The sellers and buyers agreed to a purchase price of the Old
West End residence as $78,500. Id. The defendant ordered an appraisal which
"arrived at a value equal to the sale price. The appraisal also noted the
predominant value of properties in the area to be $70,000.00." Id. The defendant
denied the loan on the basis that "the property did not qualify for maximum
financing, and the property appraisal was unacceptable." Id. The defendant
approved a second mortgage loan application after the parties agreed to a
reduction of the sale price to the amount of $70,000. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1103. The court noted that even though McDonnell Douglas was an
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held that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case under both
the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act by establishing that:
(1) the housing sought to be secured was in a minority
neighborhood; (2) that an application for a loan to purchase the
housing located in a minority neighborhood was made; (3) that an

independent appraisal concluded that the value of the housing
equaled the sale price; (4) that2 the buyers were credit worthy; and
(5) that the loan was rejected.1 6

Following the establishment of a prima facie case, the Court
held that "the defendant must produce admissible evidence which
would allow a trier of fact rationally to conclude that the decision to
reject the loan had not been motivated by a discriminatory
animus."127 The defendant produced evidence that the loan was
denied because the value of the property exceeded the predominant
value in the area and because of Fannie Mae's underwriting
guidelines relating to maximum financing.18 The court determined
that this evidence successfully rebutted the prima facie case." As a
result, the Court held that "the factually inquiry proceeds to a new
level of specificity.""'
The court analyzed the plaintiffs claims under the various civil
rights statutes from an intent standard. In assessing the intent, the
court noted that "[t]he patterns of defendants' past treatment of loan

employment case, its standards had been applied in Title VIII cases. Id. The
court explained that under the McDonnell Douglas standard, "the plaintiff has
the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie
case of discrimination." Id. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
defendant has the burden of production to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. If the defendant meets this burden, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is
in fact a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
126. Id. at 1103.
127. Id.

128. Old West End Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. at 1103. The defendant testified that
"the property did not qualify for maximum financing because 'the value of the
property exceeded the predominant value in the area, and therefore, that posed a
marketing problem should the borrower default on the loan.'" Id. Section 103 of

the Fannie Mae guidelines also stated:
When the property has a sales price that approaches the upper price
level, the loan is acceptable on maximum terms as long as the lender
believes that it does not represent a significant over improvement and
that it would appeal to enough qualified purchasers to create an active
market. When the property has a sales price that exceeds the upper
price level, the loan terms should generally be more conservative since it
may not be acceptable to the typical buyer. However, a lender should
consider the possibility that a property in an urban area is among those
being rehabilitated.
Id. at 1103-04.
129. Old West End Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. at 1104.
130. See id. (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 255(1981)).
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applications from minority neighborhoods, and departures from
standard underwriting or loan acceptance procedures may shed
some light on the defendants' purposes." 3' The plaintiffs presented
an expert witness testimony which indicated that the defendants'
application of the Fannie Mae underwriting guidelines was
improper.'
The court concluded that reasonable minds could find
that the defendant's
actions were motivated by an intent to
33
discriminate.1
"In support of their Fair Housing Act claim, plaintiffs argue[d]
that Buckeye's underwriting practices have resulted in
discriminatory effects."" The plaintiffs produced statistical evidence
which established that the defendant treated conventional mortgage
applications from white neighborhoods differently than similar
applications from integrated or minority neighborhoods.'
The court
concluded that the plaintiffs produced evidence from which
reasonable minds could conclude that defendants' action had a
discriminatory effect and thus it denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.'
As a result, the court's decision established
an analytical framework to analyze redlining cases.
In Cartwright v. American Savings & Loan Association, the
court elaborated on the type of evidence necessary to establish and
prove a cause of action based on redlining.13' American Savings and
Loan Association denied a mortgage loan application from Mary and

131. Id. at 1105.
132. Id. at 1104.
133. Id. at 1105.
134. Id. The court noted that "[p]roof of a pattern or practice of discrimination
is sufficient to sustain a violation of the Fair Housing Act." See id. (citing
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283
(7th Cir. 1977)). Courts have held that a policy that is neutral on its face may

have two types of discriminatory effects. Id. First, discriminatory effect may
result in a "greater or disparate impact on a minority group than on a nonminority group. Second, discriminatory effect may arise from disparate
treatment of different racial groups." Id.

135. Old West End Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. at 1105. The court noted:
Plaintiffs' statistics indicated that from 1981 until January, 1987,
slightly over one hundred seventy seven conventional loans were
tendered to the [defendant] for purchase. Of these loan applications,

only ten applications were submitted from areas with a racial
composition of over 20% black.

Of these ten applications, four were

submitted from neighborhoods comparable to the Old West End in
which the composition of blacks exceeded 40%. The tables then
calculate the percentage of loans in white areas rejected verses the
percentage of the four loans rejected out of the ten submitted from black
areas. The resulting figure indicates a rejection rate of 40% of the

applications submitted from neighborhoods
composition.
Id. at 1106
136. Id.
137. 880 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1989).

of over 20% black
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Lawrence Cartwright to finance the construction of a home."8 Mary
Cartwright filed suit contending that the defendant denied approval
of the loan application based upon her race and sex and engaged in
"redlining" in the neighborhood where the plaintiff she planned to
build a home.'39 American Savings moved for involuntary dismissal
based on
the argument that the plaintiff failed to establish a right of
40
relief.1
The trial court determined that there was no evidence
indicating that American Savings rejected or otherwise denied the
plaintiffs application.14 ' Further, the plaintiff failed to provide
information on comparable housing for the appraisal which she had
volunteered to provide to the defendant.' 4 ' The court concluded that
American Savings did not engage in redlining within the meaning of
Section 3605 because:
the plaintiffs' evidence failed to offer a comparison between
American Savings and other lending institutions; the relevant
amount of total mortgage activity in all relevant areas; the number
of mortgage applications received by American Savings, and the
number of those applications rejected or withdrawn; or a
relationship of comparable transactions from areas other than the
area where the Cartwrights intended to build.
In addition, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs claims
did not "fall within the ambit of § 3604 of the Fair Housing Act,...
because [it] applies to discrimination in the sale or rental of housing
rather than discrimination in the financing of housing. " '"
The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
which upheld the trial court's decision." 5 Further, the court
elaborated upon the evidence necessary to establish a redlining case.
The court noted that the plaintiff presented evidence that American
Savings granted two residential mortgage loans from January 1980
through January 1984 in the substantially black census tract
containing the plaintiffs property.'46 During the same time period,
plaintiff argued that American Savings granted thirty-six residential
mortgage loans and twenty-five residential
mortgage loans in census
7
tracts with zero to 1% black population.'
The court concluded this data was obviously flawed because it
138. Id. at 913.
139. Id. The plaintiff alleged violations of § 3604 and § 3605 of the Fair
Housing Act; Equal Credit Opportunity Act; and § 1981 and § 1982 of civil rights
statutes. Id.
140. Id. at 913-14.
141. Id. at 916.
142. Id. at 917.
143. Cartwright,880 F.2d at 917.

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 925.
Id. at 922.
Id.
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failed to identify any relevant statistical evidence of the number of
applications received from qualified borrowers in a particular census
tract and how many of those applications were rejected.14 The court
stated: "Such proof lies at the very heart of any redlining allegation,
as it is absurd to allege a discriminatory refusal to approve loan
applications in a particular area without proof that qualified
borrowers actually applied and were rejected."'49
The court
proclaimed that American Savings could not be considered
responsible for redlining a geographical area when the evidence
established that it granted every application submitted to it for
homes located in the census tract.'5 ° The court also noted that the
Fair Housing Act does not require that a lender disregard its
1
legitimate business interests or make a bad investment."
' The court
implied that it was a legitimate business interest to consider the
property value of the surrounding dwellings in accessing a loan."'
The court concluded by citing the implementing regulations of the
Fair Housing Act which state that "lenders may legitimately
consider 'the present market value of the property offered as
security.., and the likelihood that the property will retain an
adequate value over the term of the loan."' 3 The court's decision
imposed significant additional burdens upon a plaintiff attempting to
establish a redlining case.
VI. CRITIQUE OF COURT'S ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO REDLINING

The legal approach adopted by the courts to address redlining is
premised upon the intentional discrimination model articulated in
McDonnell Douglas v. Green.'" Courts however, have noted such an
approach may be problematic in certain circumstances as "clever

148. Id. The court noted that the trial record included American Savings' Loan
Application Registry Summary containing a breakdown of all residential loan
applications received from American Savings from November 1, 1980 through
1985, including the amount of the loan requested and whether the application

was granted, denied, or withdrawn. Id. at 922, note 17. The court stated,
however, the LARS report did not disclose the number of loan applications
received for property located in particular census tracts or identifiable
geographical areas. Id.
149. Cartwright,880 F. 2d at 922.

150. Id. at 923.
151. Id.

152. Id. The court commented:
It seems obvious that a lender must be concerned, for example, about
financing a new, $90,000 home in a residential area comprised of homes
valued at $60,000 or less. If the borrower defaults on the loan, the
lender must foreclose and may be unable to recoup its investment, as
potential buyers might be reluctant to pay $90,000 for the home.. in

light of the surrounding property values.
Id.
153. Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 31.8(c)(7)).
154. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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men may easily conceal their motivations""5 and that "intent, motive
and purpose are elusive subjective concepts[J""' Such concerns are
particularly relevant in the area of mortgage lending discrimination.
An applicant may be denied a mortgage loan on the basis of any
number of stated reasons, including: debt-to-income ratio,
employment history, credit history, collateral, insufficient cash,
unverifiable information, insufficient appraisals or mortgage
insurance denial. An analysis of the variables involved in rendering
a decision with regard to mortgage application requires a
sophisticated level of understanding of the mortgage process, which
the typical applicant may not possess. As a consequence, a mortgage
loan denial based on discriminatory intent is often easily hidden
among the maze of variables an applicant must navigate to obtain a
mortgage loan.
The historical origins of redlining also mitigate against the
adoption of an intent standard. Historically, the practice of racial
redlining was institutionalized by both private and public financial
institutions. The effects of such a historic process denied minority
areas access to credit because such services are simply not marketed
in redlined areas. As a consequence, persons in minority areas often
resorted to other types of financing arrangements. Thus, any focus
upon the treatment accorded applicants from minority areas may be
of limited value, as the historical impact of redlining has been to
eliminate applicants from minority areas. Indeed, if a financial
institution excels at the practice of redlining it would not receive any
applications from persons in minority areas.
The problems inherent in an intent approach were
demonstrated in Cartwright v. American Savings & Loan
Association.'1
The court's conclusions are premised upon a
fundamental lack of understanding of the purposes of the Fair
Housing Act and the historical origins of racial redlining. The court
erected a requirement that a plaintiff must establish that "qualified
borrowers actually applied and were rejected."158 The court, relying
on the testimony of Louis Green, stated that the "residential loan
applications granted in census tract 207 [were] low because
applications were few and far between, and not because American
Savings practiced credit discrimination."'59 The court failed to
consider the possibility that perhaps the reason applications were
"few and far between" was because the defendant was effective at
the practice of redlining. The court failed to consider the possibility

155. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)
(quoting United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8h Cir. 1974)).
156. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).
157. 880 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1989).
158. Id. at 922.
159. Id. at 922-23.
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of discriminatory effects of redlining which have resulted in
producing few applications. Thus, placed in the historical context, it
is hardly "absurd" to allege a discriminatory refusal to approve loan
applications in a particular area when there is no proof that qualified
borrowers actually applied and were subsequently rejected. Thus, it
is necessary to examine discriminatory effects as an alternative
analytical framework for addressing racial redlining.
VII. PERPETUATION OF SEGREGATION CLAIMS
Courts have held that Title VIII prohibits certain actions that
have the effect of perpetuating housing segregation in a
community. 6 '
Generally, these cases involved municipalities
allegedly using their zoning or other land use powers to block
construction of integrated housing developments in white areas.
The perpetuation of segregation claims may be prompted by a
particular action or decision of the defendant or an across-the-board
policy or practice.'
Such an analytical framework may be
applicable to racial redlining as such a practice has undoubtedly
contributed to the perpetuation of housing segregation.
In Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, the court established an analytical framework for
evaluating perpetuation of housing segregation claims.1 3
The
plaintiffs brought a Fair Housing Act claim under Section 3604(a)
based on the defendants refusal to rezone plaintiffs' property to
permit the construction of federally financed and racially integrated
low-cost housing.'"

16 1

160. See, e.g., Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926
(2d Cir. 1988), affid per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Keith v. Volpe, 618 F. Supp.

1132 (C.D. Cal. 1985), af'd, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Malone, 592 F.
Supp. 1135 (E.D.Mo. 1984), affd without opinion, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986);
Betsey v. Turtle Creek Ass'n, 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984); Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977);
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
161. SCHWEMM, supra note 79, at 10-39.
162. Id.
163. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
164. Id. at 1285. "The Clerics of St. Viator are a religious order who owned
eighty acres of property in Arlington Heights." Id. at 1285-86. In 1970, the
Clerics contacted the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC), a
nonprofit developer, in an effort to utilize the vacant land for low and moderate
income housing. Id. at 1286. On November 7, 1970, the Clerics sold MHDC
fifteen acres of land for $300,000, contingent upon securing of proper zoning from
the Village and an agreement from the federal government to provide financial
assistance. Id. The land was zoned R-3 for detached single family homes and
MHDC intended to build 190 connected townhouse units in 20, two-story
buildings, accordingly MHDC could not proceed unless the land was rezoned R-5
for multiple family dwellings. Id. The MHDC filed a petition for rezoning which
described the proposal as a racially integrated development for people of low and
moderate incomes. Id. On September 28, 1971, the Village Board of Trustees
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Initially, the court sought to determine if an action taken
without discriminatory intent could violate Section 3604(a). 165 The
court commented on the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act
which was "intended to promote 'open, integrated residential
housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation, in
ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the Act was
designed to combat.""6 The court noted that "[c]onduct that has the
necessary and foreseeable consequences of perpetuating segregation
can be as deleterious as purposefully discriminatory conduct."'67 The
court stated that an intent standard would place a burden on the
plaintiff that is often impossible to satisfy, particularly with regard
to municipal entities." While the court refused to adopt a per se
rule that every action which produces a discriminatory effect is
illegal, it held that in certain circumstances "a violation of Section
3604(a) can be established by a showing of discriminatory effect
without a showing of discriminatory intent."69
The court determined that it was necessary to examine four
critical factors in assessing whether the conduct produces an illegally
voted to deny the petition for rezoning. Id. The MHDC and three black
individuals filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that
the Village's denial was racially discriminatory and violated the Equal Protection
Clause, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, and the Fair Housing Act. Id.
165. Id. at 1288. Prior to the disposition of the Fair Housing Act claim, the case
was litigated as an Equal Protection clause action because the plaintiffs did not
pursue it or did not view it differently from their constitutional claim. Id. at
1286. Initially, the district court held that the Village's action did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the zoning
decision would adversely affect members of racial minorities, as opposed to poor
people. Id. Further, the district court held that the decision was motivated by a
desire to protect property values, not by racial discrimination. Id. The Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the grounds that the Village's
zoning decision "constituted a greater deprivation of housing opportunities for
black people than for white people." Id. at 1286. The court of appeals explained
that "black people in the Chicago metropolitan area.., constituted forty percent
of the group eligible [for federal housing assistance] but only eighteen percent of
the area's total population." Id. Further, the court noted that "only twenty-seven
out of the Village's 64,884 residents, compared to eighteen percent of the
residents of the entire Chicago metropolitan area, were black." Id. at 1286-87. In
this context, the Village's refusal to permit the development and inability to
present a compelling justification for the decision constituted a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1287. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision, holding that a showing of discriminatory intent was a
prerequisite to establishing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. Since
the district court had determined there was no discriminatory intent, the Court
held there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. "The Court then
remanded the case for a determination of whether the Village's conduct violated
the Fair Housing Act." Id.
166. Id. at 1289 (quoting Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122,
1134 (2d Cir. 1973)).
167. Id. at 1289.
168. Id. at 1290.
169. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290.
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discriminatory effect. The first factor was the strength of the
plaintiffs showing of discriminatory effects 7 0 In assessing this
element, the court explained that there are two types of racially
discriminatory effects:
The first occurs when that decision has a greater adverse impact on
one racial group than on another. The second is the effect which the
decision has on the community involved; if it perpetuates
segregation and thereby prevents interracial association it will be
considered invidious under the Fair Housing Act independently of
the extent to which it produces a disparate effect on different racial
171
groups.
The second factor seeks to ascertain if there is some evidence of
discriminatory intent. 172 While the court noted that the equitable
argument for relief is stronger if some direct evidence of intentional
discrimination exists, it concluded that this criterion is the least
important.7 ' The third factor measures the defendant's interest in
170. Id.
171. Id. The court stated the case of discriminatory effects in the first sense
was relatively weak because "the class disadvantaged by the Village's action was
not predominantly nonwhite [as] sixty percent of the people in the Chicago area
eligible for federal housing subsidization in 1970 were white." Id. at 1291. The
court noted that the argument for racial discrimination was not as strong as in
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Pa. 1976), where the
plaintiffs demanded the construction of public housing in a predominantly white
neighborhood in Philadelphia. Since 95% of the persons on the waiting list for
public housing in Philadelphia were minorities, the refusal to construct additional
public housing had a much larger disparate impact on nonwhites than on whites.
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1291. The court concluded, however, that this
alone was not an obstacle to relief under the Fair Housing Act. -Id.
The court proceeded to examine the discriminatory effect from the second
vantage relating to the perpetuation of segregation. Id. The court noted that
in both United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) and
Kennedy Park Homes Assoc., Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1970), local zoning ordinances prevented the construction of low-income
housing projects in overwhelmingly white municipalities. These courts found
a racially discriminatory effect because the municipal action precluded the
possibility of ending racial segregation in housing in those areas.
In this case, it was unclear whether the Village's refusal to rezone would
perpetuate segregation. The court stated that the development would increase
racial integration. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1291. The Village, however,
asserted that a substantial amount of land, which was properly zoned for
multiple family dwellings, would face no objection to construction of the
development. Id.
172. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1292. Initially, the court analyzed Section
3604, which states in part that "it shall be unlawful ... to make unavailable or
deny.., a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, or national
origin." Id. at 1287. The court noted a narrow view of the phrase is that a party
cannot commit an act "because of race" unless he intends to discriminate between
races. Id. at 1288. The broader view is that a party commits an act "because of
race" whenever the natural and foreseeable consequence of that act is to
discriminate between the races, regardless of intent. Id.
173. Id. at 1292. The court noted the difficulties of conclusive proof of
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1 74
taking the action that allegedly results in the discriminatory effect.
The court stated that if the action involved a private individual
attempting to protect private rights, "the courts cannot be overly
solicitous when the effect is to perpetuate segregated housing." 75 In
addition, the court stated that "if the defendant is a governmental
body acting outside the scope of its authority or abusing its power, it
is not entitled to the deference which courts must pay to legitimate
government action." 76
Finally, the court examined whether the plaintiff was
attempting to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing
for members of minority groups or merely to restrain the defendant
from interfering with individual property owners who wish to
provide such housing. 7 7 The court commented that requiring "a
defendant to appropriate money, utilize his land for a particular
purpose, or take other affirmative steps toward integrated housing
[was] a massive judicial intrusion." 178 Courts were "far more willing
to prohibit even nonintentional action by the state which interferes
with an individual's
plan to use his own land to provide integrated
7
housing."
The court found that only two of the four criteria pointed toward
relief, as there was no evidence of discriminatory intent and the
governmental entity was acting within the scope of its authority. 8 °
Nevertheless, since the Fair Housing Act was subject to liberal
interpretation, the court concluded that close cases must be decided
in favor of integrated housing. 8' As a consequence, the case turned
on the discriminatory effect of the zoning decision. The court held
that "if there [was] no land other than the plaintiffs' property within
Arlington Heights which [was] both properly zoned and suitable for
federally subsidized low-cost housing, the... refusal to rezone

discriminatory intent, explaining that "[t]he bigoted comments of a few citizens,
even those with power, should not invalidate an action which in fact has a
legitimate basis." Id.

174. Id. at 1293.
175. Id. See Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976)
(observing that "a thoughtless housing practice can be as unfair to minority rights
as a willful scheme").
176. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1293.

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. The court cited the Second Circuit, which "relied on the distinction
between requiring affirmative action [from] the defendant and preventing the
defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs attempt to build integrated

housing in deciding whether to grant relief under the Fair Housing Act." Id. See
Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065, 1069 (2d Cir. 1974);
Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1081 (2d Cir. 1974) (examining cases
where cities were prohibited from thwarting integration efforts by private
organizations).
180. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1293-94.
181. Id. at 1294.
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constituted a violation of Section 3604(a)." 82
The analytical standard for a perpetuation of segregation claim
was further elaborated on in Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of
Huntington.' In this case, plaintiffs alleged that "the Town violated
Title VIII by restricting private construction of multi-family housing
to a narrow renewal area and by refusing to rezone the parcel
outside [the] area where the [plaintiffs] wished to build multi-family
housing."'" The court declined to adopt the precise formulation of
Arlington Heights. 8' In particular, the court declined to include an
18 6
intent aspect in its analysis of disparate impact under Title VIII.
The court adopted a two-part test requiring the plaintiff to establish
a prima facie case by showing the discriminatory effect of an
action. 18 7 The burden then shifts to the defendant to "present bona
fide and legitimate justifications for its action with no less

182. Id.
183. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988).
184. Id. at 928.
185. Id. at 935.
186. Id. at 934. The court's decision not to require proof of discriminatory
intent was based upon several factors. Id. First, the court noted that the Fair
Housing Act's purpose required a discriminatory effects standard because "an
intent requirement would strip the statute of all impact on de facto segregation."
Id. (citing Comment, Justifying a DiscriminatoryEffect Under the Fair Housing
Act: A Search for the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REV. 398, 406 (1979)). The
court also noted that the Senate, in considering the Fair Housing Act, rejected an
amendment which would have required "proof of discriminatory intent to succeed
in establishing a Title VIII claim." Id. at 934 (citing Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977)). Second, the court explained that since
Title VII and Title VIII are "part of a coordinated scheme of federal civil rights
laws," which must be construed broadly to achieve the goal of ending
discrimination, "the two statutes require similar proof to establish a violation."
Id. at 935. Since the United States Supreme Court held that Title VII is violated
by establishing discriminatory effect, the court then reasoned that a Title VIII
violation can be established absent proof of discriminatory intent. Id. (citing
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971)). Finally, the court noted
that practical concerns dictated against an intent aspect, as facially neutral rules
often "bear no relation to discrimination upon passage, but develop into powerful
discriminatory mechanisms when applied." Id. See also Comment, Applying the
Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
128, 159 (1976) (citing case law holding that Title VIII should be generously
construed to encourage "integrated and balanced living patterns"); Frederic S.
Schwartz, The FairHousing Act and "DiscriminatoryEffect". A New Perspective,
11 NOVA L.J. 71, 73 (1987) (analyzing the Griggs decision and other housing cases
based upon it with respect to the necessity of an intent element).
187. Huntington NAACP, 844 F.2d at 936. The court relied upon Arlington
Heights for the proposition that a policy may have a discriminatory effect in two
contexts: as an adverse impact on a particular minority group or as a generalized
harm to the community through the perpetuation of segregation. Id. at 937. The
court noted that the lower court concentrated its analysis "on the harm to blacks
as a group, and failed to consider the segregative effect of maintaining a zoning
ordinance that restricts private multi-family housing to an area with a high
minority concentration." Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:617

discriminatory alternatives available."'"
In this case, the court held that the refusal to rezone resulted in
disproportionate harm to blacks and a segregative impact on the
entire community which created a strong prima facie case of
discriminatory effect. 89 The defendant argued that its actions were
justified by traffic considerations, safety concerns, and a belief that
such a policy would encourage investment in the deteriorated area.'90
The court found the defendant's justifications were weak since the
defendant's actions were more likely to result in developers investing
elsewhere and because less discriminatory means existed to
accomplish such a goal, such as tax incentives. 9 ' As a result, the
court held that "the Town violated Title VIII by refusing to amend
the zoning ordinance to permit private developers
92 to build multifamily dwellings outside the urban renewal area.'
Under either the Arlington Heights or the Huntington standard,
the primary focus of the analysis is upon the size of the segregative
effect caused by the defendant's actions and the legitimacy of the
defendant's justifications for the actions. If an action does not have a
segregative effect, it is certain the plaintiff will not prevail on the
perpetuation of segregation claim. As a consequence, it is necessary
to examine the applicability of the perpetuation of segregation claims
to a redlining cause of action.
VIII. NEW LEGAL APPROACH TO REDLINING
Several court decisions have implied that a perpetuation of
segregation claim may be a viable analytical model in the context of
redlining causes of actions. In Old West End Association v. Buckeye
Federal Savings & Loan, the court briefly addressed the issue of
discriminatory effect in its discussion of the Fair Housing Act
claims.'9
Relying on Arlington Heights, the court held that a
financial institution's underwriting practices could result in a
188. Id. at 939. The court noted that in considering a defendant's justifications,
it was guided by Title VII analysis. Id. at 936. The United States Supreme Court
explained that after "an employer's facially neutral rule is shown to have a

racially disproportionate effect on job applicants, that rule must be shown to be
substantially related to job performance." Id. (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424). The
court noted such an analytical framework was more difficult in a Title VIII case
because "there is no single objective like job performance to which the legitimacy
of the facially neutral rule may be related." Id. For example, a zoning decision is
often based upon a variety of circumstances. Id. Nevertheless, the court stated:
"The complexity of the considerations, however, does not relieve a court of the
obligation to assess whatever justifications the town advances and weigh them

carefully against the degree of adverse effect the plaintiff has shown." Id. at 93637.
189. Huntington NAACP, 844 F.2d at 938.

190. Id. at 940.
191. Id. at 939-41.
192. Id. at 941.
193. 675 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
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racially discriminatory effect." The court declined to dismiss the
case in light of statistical evidence which indicated that defendant
treated conventional loans from white neighborhoods differently
than similar
applications
from
integrated
or
minority
neighborhoods.9
Similar support for the discriminatory effects test in the context
of a redlining case may be found in Steptoe v. Savings of America.'9
In that case, the court held that evidence that Savings of America
"low-balled" the appraisal of a home that an African-American
couple wanted to purchase in a racially mixed neighborhood was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination
under the Fair Housing Act.'9 ' The court in Steptoe explained that
"in a discrimination case brought pursuant to the FHA, a plaintiff
need not prove that the defendant acted with a racially
discriminatory motive; a prima facie case can be made out by
showing that the defendant's actions had a racially discriminatory
effect."198
The court noted that even if defendant's actions were not
racially motivated, the plaintiffs had provided sufficient evidence
from which a jury could infer that Savings of America's actions had a
racially discriminatory effect.' 99 The evidence established that
Savings of America did not follow its standard appraisal procedure.9 '
Further, the plaintiffs' statistical comparison of Savings of America's
lending pattern in the minority area where the home was located to
a predominantly white area supported their position. 20' The court
concluded that the plaintiffs had established a "prima facie case that
[Savings of America's] conduct had, at the very least, a racially
discriminatory effect on the Steptoes and, possibly, all other
potential borrowers who wished to purchase homes in the [area]."" 2
The court also recognized "the importance of not mechanically
applying the McDonnell Douglas criteria, as adopted by the Buckeye
court."92 The court noted that since "lain appraisal sufficient to
support a loan request is a necessary condition precedent to a
M

194. Id. at 1106.
195. Id.
196. 800 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ohio 1992).

197. Id. at 1545-47.
198. Id. at 1546 (citing Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 103637 (2d Cir. 1979)).

199. Id. at 1546.
200. Id. at 1546-47.
201. Id. at 1547.
202. Steptoe, 800 F. Supp. at 1547. The court also held that plaintiffs assertion

that financial institution's discriminatory actions denied them the benefits of the
Community Reinvestment Act and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was
insufficient to establish a cause of action under Title VI. Id. at 1548. There was
no proof in the record that the financial institution received any federal funding
which it provided to potential mortgagors. Id.
203. Id. at 1546.
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lending institution making a home loan[, a] potential defendant in
an FHA case could always insulate itself from liability under the
Buckeye criteria by purposefully lowballing an appraisal and then
doing nothing more."" 4 The court explained that the prospective
purchaser or borrower would then be faced with two choices: "(1)
hope that he can renegotiate the purchase price to conform with the
lowballed appraisal, or (2) withdraw
his loan application as to that
20 5
particular piece of property."
The decisions in Old West End Association and Steptoe establish
two main points relevant to perpetuation of segregation claims.
First, while the decisions recognized the analytical model premised
upon the McDonnell Douglas intentional discrimination formula,
both courts identified the inherent difficulties of applying the
formula in the context of a redlining case. Second, the decisions
implied that a discriminatory effect approach may be the more
appropriate analytical methodology for examining a redlining case.
Unfortunately, the decisions did not elaborate on the specific
analytical framework for establishing discriminatory effects in a
redlining case. Nevertheless, in Old West End Association the court
relied upon Arlington Heights in its discussion of discriminatory
effects, and in Steptoe the court refused to dismiss the case based
upon evidence which suggested discriminatory effects. This appears
to indicate that the perpetuation of segregation is viable in the
context of a racial redlining case. In addition, several recent
Department of Justice lawsuits appear to use the disparate impact
theory as a methodology to challenge marketing polices and practices
which have the effect of redlining African American communities.
As a result, it is necessary to examine the Department of Justice
efforts to eradicate redlining.
IX. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND MARKETING DISCRIMINATION

A. Policy Statement
The Clinton administration, spearheaded by the Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, launched an aggressive assault on the
problems associated with mortgage lending discrimination, including
redlining. On April 6, 1994, the federal agencies responsible for
enforcing the FHA and ECOA issued a joint policy statement on
lending discrimination. °6 The policy statement was designed to
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. The federal

agencies included: Department of Housing and Urban

Development; Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; Department of
Justice; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; Office of Thrift Supervision;

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation; Federal Housing Finance Board; Federal Trade Commission; and

the National Credit Union Administration. Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed.
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explain the general principles that the federal agencies will use to
identify various types of lending discrimination, including disparate
impact.207 The policy statement explained: "When a lender applies a
policy or practice equally to credit applicants, but the policy or
practice has a disproportionate adverse impact on applicants from a
group protected against discrimination, the policy or practice is
described as having a 'disparate impact."
While the policy
statement acknowledged that the "the precise contours of the law on
disparate impact as it applies to lending discrimination are under
development," it explained possible practices that may constitute a
violation of the FHA or ECOA.2 °9 It stated:
The existence of a disparate impact may be established through
review of how a particular practice, policy or standard operates with
respect to those who are affected by it. The existence of disparate
impact is not established by a mere assertion or general perception
that a policy or practice disportionately excludes or injures people on
a prohibited basis. The existence of a disparate impact must be
established by facts. Frequently this is done through a quantitative
or statistical analysis. Sometimes the operation of the practice is
reviewed by analyzing its effect on an applicant pool; sometimes it
consists of an analysis of the practice's effect on possible applicants,
or on the population in general. Not every member of the group
must be adversely affected for the practice to have a disparate
impact. Evidence of discriminatory intent is not necessary to
establish that a policy or practice adopted or implemented by a
lender that
has a disparate impact is in violation of the FHA Act or
21
ECOA.

0

Reg. 18,266 (1994). The federal agencies were motivated by a concern that
"prospective home buyers and borrowers may be experiencing discriminatory
treatment in their efforts to obtain loans." Id. at 18,267. Such a conclusion was
based upon the 1992 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study of "lending
discrimination, Congressional hearings, and agency investigations [which]
indicated that race is a factor in some lending decisions."
statement proclaimed:

Id.

The policy

Discrimination in lending on the basis of race or other prohibited factors
is destructive, morally repugnant, and against the law. It prevents
those who are discriminated against from enjoying the benefits of access
to credit. The Agencies will not tolerate lending discrimination in any
form. Further, fair lending is not inconsistent with safe and sound
operations.
Id.
207. Id. The policy statement is applicable to "all lenders, including mortgage
brokers, issuers of credit cards, and any other person who extends credit of any
type." Id. The purpose of the policy statement was to "provide guidance about
what the agencies consider in determining if lending discrimination exists[,] and
[t]o provide a foundation for future interpretations and rulemakings by the
Agencies." Id.
208. Id. at 18,269.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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Finally, the policy provided a two-pronged defense for
allegations of disparate impact. The first step is determining
whether a disparate impact exists; the second is identifying whether
there exists a justification by "business necessity."21' If a lender
could justify the practice with a "business necessity" and establish
that there is no less discriminatory alternative, there is no violation
of the FHA or the ECOA.212 Lenders could use factors such as cost
and profitability to establish a business necessity. 213 In addition,
Deval L. Patrick, then Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division, provided additional evidentiary guidance relating to the
disparate impact of marketing discrimination stating: "the means of
service the lender has chosen and how it operates in practice; the
loan products that it offers; its efforts to reach out to minority real
estate professionals and loan applicants as compared to its efforts to
its success in extending credit to
solicit business from whites; and ...
"2 4
its market without racial impact. 1
The Department of Justice initiated a series of lawsuits to
combat lending discrimination. Several of the lawsuits, including
those against Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank and Albank
Federal Savings Bank, represented a discriminatory impact analysis
of the financial institutions marketing efforts which resulted in
redlining of minority areas. Such an approach recognizes and
acknowledges the historical and institutionalized effects of redlining.
While both cases settled pursuant to consent decrees it is necessary
to examine the allegations of the complaints and the contents of the
consent decrees to provide guidance for additional enforcement
activities relating to redlining and marketing discrimination.
B. Chevy Chase FederalSavings Bank
On August 22, 1994, the Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division filed a complaint in conjunction with a consent decree
against Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank and B.F. Saul Mortgage
Company alleging that their "policies and practices are intended to
deny, and have the effect of denying, an equal opportunity to
211. Id.

212. 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,269. The policy statement explained that the lenders
should examine whether widespread and common practices and requirements
"have an unjustifiable disparate impact." Id. at 18,269-70. In particular, lenders
should pay particular attention to requirements that are "more stringent than
customary." Id. at 18,270. The policy statement acknowledged that the

relevancy of various factors related to a credit decision, including: "the adequacy
of the borrower's income to carry the loan, the likely continuation of that income,
the adequacy of the collateral to secure the loan, the borrower's past performance
in paying obligations, the availability of funds to close, and the existence of
adequate reserves." Id. at 18,269.
213. Id. at 18,269.

214. Deval L. Patrick, Remarks at the Independent Bankers Association of
America Annual Convention (Feb. 14, 1995).
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residents of African American neighborhoods, on account of racial
identity of the neighborhood, to obtain mortgage financing and other
types of credit transactions."2 1 Prior Department of Justice lawsuits
against lenders had generally focused upon disparate treatment
accorded African American and white loan applications. 2 6

The

Chevy Chase lawsuit was unique because it focused on the
marketing practices of the bank and the discriminatory effect of
those practices upon the pool of African American applicants. As
Attorney General Janet Reno proclaimed: "To shun an entire
community because of its racial makeup, is just as217wrong as to reject
an applicant because they are African American."

Initially, the Department of Justice utilized census data to
demonstrate the high levels of racial segregation which existed in
Washington D.C. metropolitan area. According to the 1990 Census,
over 74.3% of the African American population resided in the
District of Columbia and Prince George's County. 8 In particular,
"approximately 90.3[%] of the 395,213 African American residents of
the District of Columbia reside[d] in 126 majority African American
census tracts, most of which [were] located in the Northeast,
19
Southeast, and Southwest quadrants of the city .... ,,
Upon establishing the demographics of the Washington D.C.
area, the Department of Justice analyzed the business practices and
215. Complaint, United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, Civ. Action No.

CV-94-1824JG, para. 31 (D.D.C. 1994) [hereinafter Chevy Chase complaint].
According to the complaint, Chevy Chase Federal Savings Bank is a federally
chartered savings and loan association which conducts business in the District of
Columbia, Maryland and Virginia. Id. at para. 3. Further,
Chevy Chase offers the traditional services of a financial depository

institution, including the receipt of monetary deposits, the financing of
residential housing, business, commercial and consumer loans[.] ... As
of March 31, 1993, Chevy Chase had over $3.8 billion in total deposits,

and consolidated assets of $4.7 billion which made it the largest savings
institution based in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.
Id. B.F. Saul Mortgage Co., established in 1975, "has been a wholly owned
subsidiary of Chevy Chase since 1984." Id. at para. 4. B.F. Saul "solicits and
originates real estate-related financing transactions, both residential and
commercial, in the District of Columbia and in the States of Virginia and
Maryland." Id.
216. See Complaint and Consent Decree, United States v. First Natl Bank of

Vicksburg, Civ. Action No. 5:94 CV 6(B)(N) (S.D. Miss. 1994); Complaint and
Consent Decree, United States v. Blackpipe State Bank, Civ. Action No. 93-5115

(D.S.D. 1993); Complaint and Consent Decree, United States v. Shawmut
Mortgage Co., Civ. Action No. 3.93 CV-2453AVL (D. Conn. 1993); Complaint and
Consent Decree, United States v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Civ. Action No.

1:92 CV-2198CAM (N.D. Ga. 1992).
217. Department of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Obtains
UnprecedentedSettlement FromD.C. Area Bank ForAllegedly FailingTo Service

PredominantlyBlack Areas, August 22, 1994, reprintedat (visited Mar. 22, 1999)
<http'/usdoj.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/August94/484.txt.html>.
218. Chevy Chase complaint, supra note 215 at para. 11.

219. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:617

polices of Chevy Chase and B.F. Saul Mortgage. The Department of
Justice alleged that Chevy Chase and B.F. Saul Mortgage located
nearly all their branches in white census tracts as opposed to African
American census tracts. 2 1 In addition, in 1989, Chevy Chase
dropped the District of Columbia in its entirety from its Community
Reinvestment Act service area. 22' Following criticism from the Office
of Thrift Supervision, Chevy Chase revised its delineated service
area to include the portion of the District of Columbia with the
highest percentage of white residents.222 The Department of Justice
identified several additional polices which had the effect of servicing
white residential areas, including: utilizing a commission structure
that provided incentives to solicit and originate mortgage loans on
higher-priced homes; employing few African Americans as loan
officers or originators; and rarely or never utilizing newspapers,
radio stations, or other media outlets that were oriented to the
African American community to advertise its mortgage products. 2'
The Department of Justice proceed to demonstrate the racial
impact of these polices and practices by comparing statistics
revealing the number of home mortgage loan applications received
by Chevy Chase and B.F. Saul in white census tracts and African
American census tracts. "During 1991, Chevy Chase and the B.F.
Saul Mortgage Company received 3,515 mortgage loan applications
from the Washington D.C. metropolitan area. Of these applications,
3,432 (97.6%) were received from applicants in white census tracts,
and 83 (2.4%) were received from applicants residing in African
American census tracts."" Further, "[d]uring 1993, Chevy Chase
and the B.F. Saul [I] received 7,311 mortgage loan applications from
the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Of these applications,
6,947 (95.0 percent) were received from applicants in white census
tracts, and 364 (5.0 percent) were received from applicants in
majority African American census tracts."221
In addition, the
Department of Justice analyzed the market share of Chevy Chase
and B.F. Saul in white census tracts and African American census

220. Id. at para. 13-14. The Department of Justice alleged that as of June 29,

1993, Chevy Chase located 70 of the then existing 74 branches in white census
tracts. Id. at para. 13. Further, two of the branches located in African American
census tracts were acquired as part of a purchase of another institution. Id. A

third branch was located in a census tract which was white when the branch first
opened. Id. The remaining branch in a majority African American census tract
was located outside the Washington D.C. metropolitan area. Id. As of June 29,
1993, B.F. Saul Mortgage located 17 of its 18 mortgage offices in white census
tracts. Id. at para. 14. In May, 1993, B.F. Saul opened its only location in a
primarily African American census tract. Id.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at para. 16.
Id.
Id. at para. 18.
Chevy Chase complaint, supra note 215, at para. 20.
Id. at para. 21.
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tracts. "[F]rom 1990 through 1992, [Chevy Chases'] share of all
purchase money mortgages originations in white census tracts
ranged from 1.5 percent to 2.1 percent. During that same period, the
defendants' share of such mortgages originated in majority African
22 6
American census tracts ranged from 0.2 percent to 0.4 percent."
The Department of Justice argued that the sharp distinctions in
home mortgage loan activity between white and African American
census tracts demonstrated the disparate impact of Chevy Chase
and B.F. Saul marketing polices and practices which were not
supported by a business necessity. The Department of Justice
concluded: "[t]he totality of the polices and practices described herein
amount to a redlining of African American residential neighborhoods
of the Washington D.C.
metropolitan area as off-limits for the
227
defendants' business."
The Department of Justice and Chevy Chase and B.F. Saul
entered into a consent decree to settle the claims of alleged unlawful
discrimination. The consent decree required Chevy Chase and B.F.
Saul to "implement an aggressive marketing program designed to
improve [their] performance in meeting the credit needs of the
African American community in the Washington D.C. metropolitan
area."2 8 The consent decree required Chevy Chase to invest at least
seven million dollars in the form of subsided special mortgage loans
which would result in approximately 140 million dollars in special
financing to residents of African American census tracts that were
redlined.229 Further, Chevy Chase agreed to open additional bank
branches or mortgage office locations in African American
neighborhoods in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area and enact
an advertising program which included special provisions to target
residents of predominantly African American neighborhoods." ° The
objective of the consent decree was to achieve "a market share of
home mortgage loans in majority African American census tracts
that is reasonably comparable to the Bank and Mortgage Company's
market share in white residential areas ....231
C. Albank FederalSavings Bank
The Department of Justice's efforts to combat redlining in the
form of marketing discrimination continued with a lawsuit against
226. Id. at para. 26.

The Department of Justice explained that such

"disparities in market share of loan originations [were] statistically significant...
and [could not] be explained by random, non-racial variations in the defendants'
marketing and loan solicitation practices." Id.
227. Id. at para. 31.
228. Consent Decree, United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, Civ. Action
No. CV-94-1824JG (D.D.C. 1994) at 16.

Decree].
229. Id. at 27.
230. Id. at 19.
231. Id. at 16.

[hereinafter Chevy Chase Consent
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Albank Federal Savings Bank.232 Albank provided direct mortgage
lending and indirect 'mortgage lending through correspondents. 33
The Department of Justice alleged that "[s]tarting in the late 1980's,
Albank began informing, and explicitly instructing, correspondents
that it would not accept loans originating in specific geographic areas
of Connecticut and Westchester

County, New York."234

Such

restrictions were without "sound business justification" and were
adopted to preclude "residents of identifiably minority urban areas
from seeking mortgage loans from the defendants,
without regard to
235
the qualifications of such persons for credit."
In Connecticut, Albank agreed to fund mortgage loans through
correspondent bankers and brokers in western Connecticut but
explicitly prohibited such loans from five cities: Hartford, New
Haven, New Britain, Waterbury, and Bridgeport.2 6
African
Americans and Hispanics comprised a majority of the population in
three of these cities,' and a quarter of the population in the other
two. 37 During the time period of 1992 through 1996, Albank
accepted only three loan applications from these cities, two of which
were from whites and one from an Asian American. 2" Albank had
additional restrictions which affected Stamford and Norwalk, two

232. "In early 1997, the OTS [Office of Thrift Supervision] conducted a special
examination of the practices of Albank to evaluate its compliance with the Fair
Housing Act and the ECOA [Equal Credit Opportunity Act]." Complaint at 8,
United States v. Albank, FSB, and Albank Financial Corporation, 97-CV-1206,
Complaint para. 8. [hereinafter Albank Complaint]. The OTS's investigation
determined that "Albank had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination
against African American and Hispanic borrowers by instructing its
correspondents not to submit loan applications from specified geographic areas
where there [were] high concentrations of these minority homeowners." Id. On
May 12, 1997, OTS referred the matter to the Department of Justice which then
conducted a supplemental investigation. Id.
233. According to the Department of Justice complaint, "Albank made
approximately 60% of its home mortgage loans through correspondents." Id. at
para. 11. Albank and correspondents entered into contractual arrangements to
fund adjustable rate mortgages that meet requirements specified by Albank. Id.
at para. 12. Albank participates in the underwriting process by receiving and
reviewing preliminary information to determine if it deviates from Albank
requirements. Id. Following Albank's approval of a prospective loan, the
correspondent arranges the consummation of the loan with Albank acting as the
mortgage lender at closing. Id.
234. Id. at para. 14. Founded in 1820, Albank initially operated only in the
Albany, New York area before expanding into other parts of New York and
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, Kentucky, and Ohio." Id. at para. 9.
235. Id. at para. 14. To refute any potential arguments regarding the demand
for such products in minority areas, the Department of Justice contended that the
adjustable-rate mortgage was an appealing product that the correspondents
desired to sell, and some of the correspondents repeatedly asked Albank to
eliminate the geographic restrictions. Id. at para. 15.
236. Id. at para. 16.
237. Id.
238. Albank Complaint, supra note 232, at para. 16.
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cities in Connecticut which had an African American and Hispanic
combined populations of approximately 25%.239 From 1992 through
1996, in Stamford, Albank took sixteen loan applications of which
fourteen were from whites, one from an African American and one
from a Hispanic." ° The Department of Justice concluded that, as a
result of the geographic restrictions, "Albank took purchase and
refinance home mortgage loan applications in Connecticut almost
exclusively from white customers, and almost exclusively from
properties in white residential areas."241
The Department of Justice alleged that Albank instituted a
similar policy in Westchester County, New York. Beginning in the
mid-1980's, Albank "prohibited its correspondent mortgage bankers
and brokers from offering loans to Albank for properties located in
any portion of Westchester County lying below Interstate 287. "2
According to the census data, "the excluded area contained 76.7% of
the county's African American population and 66.5% of its Hispanic
population." 3 As a result, "[flrom 1992 through 1996, Albank took
203 loan applications from Westchester County, of which only seven
were from African American and Hispanic applicants."'" Further,
"[o]nly 10 of the 203 applications were from [c]ensus tracts that were
not majority white."' 4
The Department of Justice allegations concluded that "Albank
had engaged in discriminatory redlining through its geographic
The
restrictions in Connecticut and Westchester County."246
geographic restrictions were essentially a marketing policy which
had "both the purpose and effect of denying residents of identifiable
African American and Hispanic communities an equal opportunity to
obtain mortgage financing on account of the minority composition of
these communities." 7
Herbert G. Chorbajian, Chairman, President, and Chief
Executive Officer of Albank, "categorically" denied the Department
of Justice's allegations and cited Albank's "[o]utstanding" rating on
239. Id. at para. 17. "Albank did not explicitly exclude loans from Stamford and
Norwalk. ... " Id. Rather, it informed some correspondents that it "would not
accept loans from the 'Long Island Sound area.'" Id. Albank defined this area as
the corridor along Interstate 95, which included Stamford and Norwalk. Id.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id. at para. 18.
Id. at para. 19.
Id.
Albank Complaint, supra note 232 at para. 20.

245. Id. The Department of Justice also alleged that "[w]hen Albank made
exceptions to its policy... it did so almost exclusively for white borrowers living

in white areas." Id. at para. 21. From 1992 through 1996, Albank took 39
Westchester county loan applications on property located south of 1-287, of which
none was from an African American or Hispanic, and only four originated from a
non-white majority tract. Id.
246. Id. at para. 22.
247. Id.
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each of its last three bi-annual Community Reinvestment Act
examinations.'
Mr. Chorbajian explained that the criteria utilized
by Albank with regards to loans from its correspondents was based
upon "credit quality considerations" and the "desire to stay within
markets similar to [Albank's] upstate New York lending area."249 He
also noted that "Albank has never directly originated mortgage
loans in Connecticut and Westchester County' and that '[t]hese areas
were not part of [Albank's] primary lending market area or CRA
delineated service area."'25 ° Nevertheless, Albank agreed to enter
into a consent decree in order to avoid litigation with the
understanding that the consent decree was not an admission or a
finding of any violation of law.25'
According to the terms of the consent degree, Albank agreed to
provide at least fifty-five million dollars in mortgage loans at below
the prevailing interest rate to the areas redlined. 252 Further, Albank
agreed to conduct target advertising and public information
campaigns on mortgage loan opportunities and contribute at least
$350,000 to a home ownership counseling program. 253 Attorney
General Janet Reno stated: 'Today's settlement will help ensure that
residents of the redlined areas will have a chance to obtain credit.
We commend Albank for moving promptly to resolve this matter in a
way that will provide new home ownership opportunities for so many
people."2 "
D. Analysis of Departmentof Justice Legal Actions
Several commentators have been critical of the Department of
Justices' actions in the Chevy Chase and Albank lawsuits. 5 In
248. John J. Spina, Notes & Comments: United States v. Albank FSB: Is
"Justice"Being Served in the Enforcement of FairLending Laws? 2 N.C. Banking
Inst. 207, 213 (1998).
249. Id.

250. Id.
251. Consent Decree, United States v. Albank, 97-CV-1206, at 4 [hereinafter
Albank Consent Decree].

252. Id. at 6, para. 1-2. The consent decree provided that Albank would make
at least $20 million in below-market loans to the areas south of Interstate 287 in

Westchester County, New York and $35 million in below-market loans within the
cities of Hartford, New Haven, New Britain, Waterbury, Bridgeport, Stamford,
and Norwalk and on properties located in 25% or greater non-white census tracts.
Id. at 9-10, para.8-9. Under the consent decree, the total cost of Albank's belowmarket loan program was $3.3 million for Westchester County and $4.9 million
for Connecticut. Id. at 10, para. 10.
253. Id. at 7, para. 4.
254. Department of Justice Press Release, Albank to Make $55 Million in
DiscountedLoans for Allegedly Engagingin Redlining, UnderJustice Department
Settlement, Aug. 13, 1997, at 2 reprinted at (visited Mar. 22, 1999)

<http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1997/August97/334cr.htm>.
255. See, e.g., Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the Boundaries of the Community
Reinvestment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based
Framework for Generating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L.
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particular, the critics contend that the Department of Justice
overstepped its authority by expanding the fair lending laws to
include low and moderate-income community disinvestment
issues. 256 In addition, such commentators contend that the
Department of Justice failed to satisfy the requirements of the
disparate impact analysis by providing only evidence of uneven
marketing strategies and community disinvestment.257
Such
criticism is rebutted, however, by the historical and legal
interpretation of redlining under the perpetuation of segregation
analysis.
First, the critics have failed to analyze the historical context of
mortgage lending discrimination and its effects on marketing
practices currently utilized by financial institutions.
The
discriminatory practices of the HOLC and FHA were
institutionalized by the private sector resulting in its failure to
provide home mortgage loan services to redlined minority areas.
Such a historical legacy currently manifests itself in the marketing
practices maintained by financial institutions which focus on white
residential areas. Such a conclusion is supported by numerous
studies which continue to confirm the existence of racial redlining.
As a consequence, the Department of Justices' actions may be seen
as an appropriate response to widespread marketing practices which
have resulted in continued abandonment of minority areas by
financial institutions.
Second, the critics have failed to adequately examine the
perpetuation of segregation claims in the disparate impact analysis.
Under either the Arlington Heights or the Huntington standard, the
primary focus of the analysis is upon the size of the segregative effect
caused by the defendant's actions and the legitimacy of the
defendant's justifications for the action.
The Department of Justice evaluated the financial institutions
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data and Community Reinvestment
documents in conjunction with the census tract data for the
metropolitan statistical area and demonstrated that the financial
institutions marketing practices resulted in a discriminatory effect
as reflected in its lending patterns. Such evidence established that
the lending practices had a greater adverse impact on one racial
group than on another and it perpetuated segregation by preventing
interracial association. The Department of Justices' action may be
seen as perpetuation of segregation claims which established the
discriminatory effects of redlining.
REV. 710 (1996) (detailing perceived shortcomings of the Chevy Chase case);
Spina, supra note 248 at 223-29 (claiming that the Chevy Chase and Albank suits
reflected that the Department of Justice was "basing its enforcement of fair

lending laws on uncertain legal ground.")
256. Marcus, supra note 255, at 729 n.105.

257. Id.
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The Department of Justice's actions in Chevy Chase and
Albank provide an innovate response to the continued problem of
redlining. In particular, the complaints challenge the disparate
impact of marketing policies and practices which preclude minority
areas from credit. As Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights, stated: 'Weare not telling banks
where to do business, or that they cannot use economic factors to
decide where and how to market loans..., [b]ut loan marketing
decisions should be based on credit risk and other legitimate
business considerations, and not on the racial or ethnic makeup of a
community."" 8
X. CONCLUSION
Orlando Patterson has identified several areas that act as
constraints on individual agency, including Acts of History.259 Mr.
Patterson defined Acts of History, often referred to as institutional
discrimination, as "the accumulated patterns of discrimination over
long periods of time against particular groups of people that create
not only generalized disabilities of a collective nature but also
generalized advantages to those who benefit from the
discrimination."260 As the historical analysis of the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration
indicated, racial redlining represents a dramatic example of an Act
of History which has had the effect of maintaining segregation and
contributing to the "ghettoization" of the city. As a recent report
noted: "It]he long and infamous history of housing and lending
discrimination in this country scarred the lives of millions of families
seeking to realize the dreams and aspirations of all Americans-to
own a home."26'
President Clinton's Advisory Board on Race
concluded:
Many poor minority residents live in segregated, isolated and
stigmatized neighborhoods.
Racial segregation, limited job
opportunities, and discrimination continue to serve as a basis for
persistent minority poverty. As a result, efforts to remove these
barriers to prosperity are important, although not easy, and will
require commitment from government, business, the nonprofit
community and local communities.262
The courts must adopt a pragmatic analytical framework for
258. Department of Justice Press Release, Albank to Make $55 Million in
Discounted Loans for Allegedly Engagingin Redlining, under Justice Department
Settlement, Aug. 13, 1997, at 3.
259. ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND
RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S "RAcIAL" CRISIS 121 (1997).
260. Id.
261. THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 9, at 1.
262. Word for Word/1968 and 1969; The Fire Wasn't This Time: Two Race
Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, § 4 at 7.
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interpreting racial redlining that functions as an effective tool to
eradicate the historic pattern of mortgage lending discrimination
perpetrated upon minority communities.
The perpetuation of
segregation claims, as demonstrated by the Department of Justices'
actions presents a promising framework to evaluate redlining cases
in light of its historical origins and the goals of the Fair Housing Act.
In addition, such a standard would serve to foster the goals of the
Fair Housing Act to promote open, integrated residential housing
patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation of racial groups.

